Overview

The current fighting in the Gaza Strip, which resumed at the beginning of 2025 following the collapse of the most recent ceasefire, is not occurring in a vacuum. It is part of a complex web of interests, threats, and opportunities shaping the Middle East as a whole. The campaign in Gaza is not solely about achieving military objectives within the Strip; it is part of a broader struggle over the future of the region—particularly in the context of Iran and the “Axis of Resistance,” and also in the context of the global confrontation with radical Islam.

Regarding Gaza and the war against Hamas more broadly, the government set out several objectives at the outset of the war and remains committed to achieving all of them:

1. The destruction of Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s military capabilities and their governmental and organizational infrastructure in Gaza.
   
   
2. Creating the conditions for the return of all hostages to Israel.
   
   
3. Ensuring that, at the war’s end, the Gaza Strip no longer poses a long-term threat to Israel.
   
   
4. Restoring security for the residents of the Gaza envelope, including the establishment of a “buffer zone” inside the Strip.

A fifth objective was later added concerning the northern front: the safe return of Israel’s northern residents to their homes.

This paper analyzes the campaign in Gaza and the path toward achieving Israel’s stated objectives. First, it is necessary to examine the current situation in the context of the fighting in the Gaza Strip.

The Current Situation

The current stage of the fighting began after Hamas rejected Israel’s terms for a hostage release deal—a rejection that reflects its strategic intent to maintain de facto control over the Gaza Strip in any future arrangement. Hamas is demanding a full IDF withdrawal from the Strip, including from the area designated as a security buffer and from the Philadelphi Corridor—conditions that would allow it to rearm and prepare for the next round of conflict. This would not only enable Hamas to persuade its target audiences that the terror attack it launched on October 7 was justified, but it is already preparing for the next October 7. Hamas views that event as a great victory and is undeterred by the heavy toll exacted on it and on the population of Gaza.

A similar event could recur in Gaza if Israel yields to Hamas’s demands—or erupt in Judea and Sameria if Hamas is not dismantled militarily and administratively in Gaza to serve as a deterrent “so that others may see and fear.”

Following Hamas’s rejection of Israel’s terms for completion of the hostage deal and the U.S. proposal (the Witkoff framework) to extend the ceasefire in exchange for the return of half of the hostages, Israel resumed its military operations. The immediate aim was to increase pressure on Hamas to accept the deal.

During the ceasefire, Hamas managed to partially recover, primarily by controlling the distribution of humanitarian aid. It is now attempting to strike at Israel through rocket fire—albeit in extremely low numbers—and guerilla attacks on IDF forces operating inside the Strip. The IDF’s operational pattern remains measured and slow. The military is gradually expanding its control over various areas of Gaza and is engaging targets with fire. This method entails a modest in pressure applied against Hamas but is insufficient to compel a change in the group’s position or to bring about a substantive shift in the IDF’s control over the Strip.

Currently (End of April 2024), Israel is preventing the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Supplies for both the civilian population and Hamas fighters are currently being drawn from humanitarian aid stockpiles that Hamas amassed during the fighting, especially over the 42-day ceasefire period, during which large quantities of aid entered the Strip. Eventually, these reserves will be depleted, and Hamas will face a dilemma over how to proceed.

It is important to recall that the IDF’s past combat approach was defined by two key principles: first, avoiding engagement with the civilian dimension and the imposition of even temporary military governance—that is, avoiding involvement in managing the entry and distribution of humanitarian aid; and second, avoiding full territorial conquest followed by clearing and holding. Instead, the IDF would enter areas, destroy enemy infrastructure, and then withdraw—the so-called “raid method.”

These two principles ultimately exhausted the credit the military received from the Israeli state and undermined the IDF’s ability to achieve the war’s objectives. In areas where the IDF acted differently—such as the Netzarim corridor, the Philadelphi Corridor, and more recently in northern Gaza—the impact on Hamas was evident, and senior Hamas figures expressed concern over this operational approach and its potential expansion.

The IDF has shifted its approach in both respects. The army is capturing territory with the intent to clear and hold. The defense minister has announced that captured areas will be incorporated into the security buffer zone to enhance the security of communities near Gaza. In parallel, both the defense minister and the IDF chief of staff have declared that if aid is resumed the IDF will assume indirect responsibility for its distribution.

The Key to Achieving Israel’s War Objectives

The key to fulfilling Israel’s war objectives lies in the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities—in other words, the complete elimination of Hamas as the governing entity in Gaza. This is a necessary condition for the organization’s total defeat. Necessary, but not sufficient. Hamas is a symptom of a deeper and broader problem in the Gaza Strip: the psychological and ideological infrastructure of the Palestinian public is one of perpetual struggle aimed at the destruction of the State of Israel. It is reasonable to assume that even if an alternative governing authority is established in Gaza after Hamas’s total defeat, these underlying currents will persist, and under such conditions, it will only be a matter of time before a new threat to Israel emerges from the Strip.

Therefore, the central requirement for achieving the war’s goal—that Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel in the long-term—is the establishment of complete security control over Gaza through a physical presence on the ground (the model that has existed in Judea and Sameria since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002), rather than standoff, Israel’s pre–October 7 posture in Gaza. However, to secure sustained calm over the long term, from a strategic viewpoint, Israel will need either an effective and swift de-radicalization program (which has slim chances of success) or to implement Trump’s vision: the voluntary emigration of Gaza’s population to other countries.

To facilitate the Trump vision, the IDF and the State of Israel must create the conditions to enable emigration from Gaza. The IDF is currently operating in the Rafah area, which has been cleared of civilians to capture and clear the territory up to the Morag axis. The main lever of pressure on Hamas is separating it from the civilian population. At present, Hamas has total control over the Mawasi humanitarian safe zone. Evacuating civilians from that area would strip Hamas of its primary leverage.

Accordingly, we propose the establishment of a new humanitarian zone in the Rafah area and to transfer the civilian population there through controlled corridors that prevent the passage of hostile actors. This new humanitarian zone in Rafah would include a temporary, partial military administration, allowing for the distribution of aid under IDF oversight and through humanitarian organizations managed and monitored by foreign security companies, an approach that has already proven workable elsewhere in the Strip. Doing so would allow the IDF to focus offensive operations in areas of Gaza that have been cleared of civilians and relocated to the new enclave. This enclave would also serve as a transit camp to facilitate the emigration of Gaza residents to third countries willing to receive them.

Civil governance in the new humanitarian zone in Rafah would rest on the following principles: stabilization of the area through deepened control over territory and population where the IDF is present; assertion of control over the distribution of humanitarian aid within the zone; and the establishment of humanitarian areas that could be operated by foreign companies (aid organizations with the ability to provide their own security). This would occur without any presence or influence—military or civilian—of Hamas within the enclave. Local power brokers may be enlisted, subject to Shin Bet security vetting and alignment with Israel’s security interests.

As previously noted, the destruction of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a precondition for any future arrangement in the territory. This necessitates full military and civil control subject to the following principles: the IDF would be the sole security force operating in the Strip and would retain full operational freedom for years to come; and control over all border crossings into Gaza—including the Rafah crossing and the entire Philadelphi Corridor, both above and below ground—would rest entirely with Israel.

Security Control

As for security control, the IDF must ensure a continuous and long-term presence in the area, with the aim of deepening the clearance of territory to eliminate any remaining capabilities that could threaten IDF forces or the Israeli home front. It is important to remember that ostensibly “civilian” actors have also taken part in the fighting. The optimal method for achieving this level of control is through a territorial operational doctrine, similar to the one used in Judea and Samaria.

The proposed operational configuration is as follows: During the interim period—two to three years—until the complete dismantlement of Hamas’s military power in the Gaza Strip, the area would be divided among three mission-oriented territorial divisions, in line with the current force deployment in the Strip: the Gaza Division would cover the perimeter, including the Philadelphi Corridor; one divisional headquarters would be established in northern Gaza; and another would be responsible for the central and southern parts of the Strip. Each division would oversee two to three regional brigades, depending on operational needs. The placement and structure of these brigades should be determined based on the evolving situation on the ground. In the longer term, and depending on future developments, the military presence in the Strip could be reduced to two territorial divisions: one covering the perimeter and the Philadelphi Corridor, and one division responsible for the remainder of Gaza.

The Emigration Issue

The Gaza Strip is likely to remain a source of chronic instability for many years to come. Since Hamas’s takeover of the Strip, we have witnessed a recurring cycle: a round of fighting, followed by international reconstruction efforts—much of the resources of which end up being used to restore Hamas’s military capabilities—and then another round of violence. Discussions around rebuilding Gaza tend to put the cart before the horse, ignoring the more fundamental question: is it even possible to rebuild the Gaza Strip, and can its population ever detach from the mindset of a perpetual struggle to destroy Israel?

One commonly cited example is the postwar reconstruction of Nazi Germany through a process of de-Nazification, based on the assumption that a similar process of de-Hamasization could be applied in Gaza. While protests against Hamas have broken out at multiple locations across the Strip, they have been directed specifically against Hamas and have not reflected any meaningful shift in the protesters’ views toward the conflict with Israel. Surveys and historical data consistently show that most Palestinians, both in Gaza and beyond, are unwilling to relinquish the vision of Israel’s destruction.

Therefore, we propose advancing a policy that encourages the emigration of Palestinians from Gaza to third countries that would be willing to accept them—provided the necessary political and financial incentives are in place. To implement such a move, an understanding must be reached with the U.S. administration so that it remains committed to this approach as a mechanism for reducing long-term regional (and global) instability and as a means of providing a humanitarian solution for the population. It is important to note that the majority of Gaza’s residents hold refugee status—an outcome of a long-standing historical distortion—and as such, they are entitled to receive resettlement assistance like other refugees around the world.

The Hostage Issue

Hamas’s rejection of the proposals put forward by mediators and its insistence on its initial demands—including a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza, a return to full control of the Strip, rearmament, and a personal guarantee from Trump to prevent renewed fighting—demonstrate just how limited the prospects are for securing the release of all hostages through a negotiated deal.

In our assessment, Hamas will always seek to retain a some of the hostages as an insurance policy. In fact, a full takeover of the Strip and the removal of aid distribution from Hamas’s hands could exert the kind of pressure needed to bring it to agree to a deal—whether in exchange for a safe exit of its personnel from Gaza, or because the parties actually holding the hostages or possessing information about them might be prompted to cooperate with Israel.

Allowing Hamas to remain in Gaza and rebuild its operational capabilities will inevitably lead to another attack on the Gaza Envelop communities and renewed rocket fire into the Israeli heartland. This would result in the abandonment of these communities—a scenario that would leave Israel with no room for maneuver and thus requires that the IDF act to achieve the war’s objectives through the application of overwhelming force.

The Iranian Context

Events in the Gaza Strip have a direct bearing on the ongoing U.S. negotiations with Iran and the future of Tehran’s nuclear project. Iran, which for years served as the central force behind the Axis of Resistance, now finds itself in a position of significant weakness. The collapse of Hamas in Gaza, pressure to dismantle Hezbollah as an armed force in Lebanon, the loss of the Assad regime in Syria, U.S. strikes in Yemen, and the threat of force against Iran itself, all lead Tehran to a difficult crossroads.

Nonetheless, Iran’s weakness does not eliminate the threat it poses. Iran continues to destabilize the region through its proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, and it is actively seeking ways to renew its influence over Hamas. This creates a strategic opportunity for Israel to deepen its regional achievements. The Trump framework for Gaza provides an important lever for doing so.

Conclusion

The war’s objectives, as formulated at its outset, are achievable. There is no use lamenting past missteps, but had Israel followed a consistent operational path from the beginning—alongside assuming responsibility for aid distribution and oversight—it would now be in a significantly better position to realize its war goals, including the release of the hostages, as demonstrated by the deal implemented in November 2023.

Israel must, through its security establishment, assume direct responsibility for the distribution of humanitarian aid—utilizing civilian contractors and vetted local actors—alongside necessary elements of military governance. At the same time, it must create the conditions to enable the emigration of Gaza’s population. Establishing a humanitarian transit camp in the Rafah area is a key part of this process.

There is a real danger that the current interim phase will drag on without yielding any progress toward recovering the hostages. The situation is further complicated by internal Israeli discourse and by attempts from various actors to halt the war—which in effect would amount to surrendering to Hamas. Added to this is the risk of eroding the credit extended by the new American administration and the desire of President Trump to move forward with his broader objectives in the region.

At the same time, it would be both prudent and appropriate to make another effort to secure an agreement that would reduce the number of hostages held by Hamas. Efforts in this direction since the last deal have failed—partly due to Hamas’s fear that any concession would be seen as weakness and diminish its deterrence, and partly due to the encouragement Hamas derives from internal Israeli debates and calls to end the war, which reinforce its intransigence.

The time has come to shift gears and move toward a full and decisive offensive, based on the principles outlined above. This would not only help achieve the war’s objectives but also send a clear message to the region and allow Israel to redirect national attention to the broader strategic threat: Iran.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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