Israeli-Turkish relations continue their unabated freefall. On October 1, during the opening session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s new legislative year, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Israel to be the emerging national security threat to Turkey.[i] A week later, on October 8, the “Israeli threat” gained an unprecedented level of public attention when the TGNA held a “top secret closed session” on this matter. According to the Turkish press, while highlighting the latest developments in Gaza and Lebanon, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs briefed lawmakers on the situation, emphasizing developments in the ongoing war in Gaza and Lebanon. The veil of secrecy surrounding the session was reinforced when the Turkish press reported that the protocols of the session would remain classified for ten years.[ii]
Sacrificing immediate interests for ideological passions
It was not that long ago (September 20, 2023) that Erdoğan hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the “Turkish House” in New York during the annual UN General Assembly. The two leaders posed warmly for the cameras and discussed advancing the fragile normalization between Jerusalem and Ankara, focusing on cooperation in energy, technology, artificial intelligence and cyber security.[iii]
However, Hamas’ unprovoked brutal attack against Israel on October 7 last year put an end to the normalization process between the countries. Rather than condemning Hamas as the aggressor, Erdoğan chose to whitewash the terrorist group, referring to Hamas as “freedom fighters” –likening it to the Turkish militia, the Kuvay-ı Milliye that fought against the Western occupiers during the Turkish War of Independence (1919 – 1922).[iv]
Ever since bilateral relations were established, Israel has been aware of Turkey’s sensitivity toward the Palestinian cause. Jerusalem’s efforts to decouple bilateral relations with Ankara from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been successful. Nevertheless, both countries managed to focus on economic cooperation and bilateral trade and tourism reached 9.5 billion dollars.[v]
Despite Erdoğan’s Muslim Brotherhood-oriented policy outlook, for years, these immediate economic interests pushed him to maintain a pragmatic stance toward Israel. Rather than severing ties with the Jewish state, Erdoğan pursued an ambivalent policy – preserving ambassadorial-level relations with Israel, while simultaneously fostering a close relationship with Hamas, allowing its members to reside in Turkey and even providing them with passports.[vi]
However, after the war in Gaza, Turkey under Erdoğan began to gradually sacrifice those immediate interests. Initially, on October 10, 2023, Turkish Airlines suspended all direct flights to Israel,[vii] a huge blow for people-to-people relations. Ties reached a new, unprecedented low on April 9 when Turkey imposed a unilateral trade ban on 54 strategic products including cement and steel.[viii] Just three weeks later, on May 2, Ankara escalated to an extreme by halting all trade with Israel entirely.[ix] In effect, officially, nothing tangible remains from the relationship other than two embassies with low-profile representation.
Turkish foreign policy as a domestic public relations tool
The decision to sacrifice bilateral relations for the sake of Pan-Islamist ideology was not only intended to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians, but it also directed at Turkish domestic politics. The losses at the March 31, 2024, Turkish municipal elections were an unbearable blow for Erdoğan. In addition to suffering defeat to the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) in major cities like Istanbul and Ankara, Erdoğan also lost many of his strongholds in the periphery tot the Islamist opposition. In retrospect it appears that Erdoğan’s previous willingness to continue trade relations with Israel pushed some of his once-loyal supporters toward other Islamist political parties, such as the New Welfare Party. To counter this trend, Erdoğan halted trade relations, aiming to neutralize one of the key political tools available to his Islamist rivals.[x]
Unsurprisingly, this decision had a negative impact on Turkish engaged in trade with Israel. To maintain their long-standing trade relationships, these companies found alternative ways to conduct business through intermediary Mediterranean ports. It later became evident that they had devised a creative way to maintain their dealings with their Israeli partners: goods were no longer exported directly to Israel but instead to “Palestine.” Palestinian companies located in the Palestinian Authority-controlled areas of Judea and Samaria acted as “official receivers” of the goods These companies likely received a commission from the transaction, after which the products were transferred to Israeli companies – the real trade partners of the Turkish firms. Statistics confirm this trend; according to figures from the Turkish Export Association, exports to Palestine have surged by 1,180% compared to the previous year. Despite the anti-Israeli rhetoric, the economies of both countries remained largely unharmed, thanks to the ingenuity of Turkish businessmen.[xi]
A sharp U-turn in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel
Turkey’s negative stance toward Israel reached a new level on August 7 when Ankara officially became a party to South Africa’s lawsuit against the State of Israel at the International Court of Justice.[xii] Turkey chose to ignore the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and additionally accused Israel of conducting war crimes and genocide, despite Hamas’ use of Palestinian civilians as human shields and its confiscation of humanitarian aid, which prevented Palestinian civilians from accessing basic goods.
In line with the Turkish government’s overtly pro-Hamas stance, Turkish media (TV and press) also began siding with Hamas. Not only did they portray Hamas as a freedom-fighting movement, but these news outlets also ignored the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians on October 7. Demonization of Israel and hatred of the Jewish state have become consensus in the Turkish press. In this context, various derogatory prefixes, acronyms, and nicknames are now used to delegitimize Israel and its actions in the Gaza Strip. Terms such as “Israel Terrorist Organization (İTÖ)[xiii],” “Terror State Israel,”[xiv] “Occupier State,”[xv] “Virus,”[xvi] and “ZioNazis”[xvii] have emerged as commonly used derogatory labels for the Jewish state.
As the war expanded to other theaters – such as Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq –criticism of Israel grew increasingly harsh. As has been the case with Hamas, these critiques –including those voiced by Erdoğan himself –ignored the deliberate attacks by Iran’s proxies against Israel, which began on October 8, 2023, in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza. Inevitably, as every sovereign state must, Israel defended itself and launched retaliations The targeted killings of arch-terrorists like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, as well as Mossad’s “cyber-paper” attack on Hezbollah terrorists, have made an unprecedented contribution to strengthening Israel’s standing. Additionally, Israel’s ability to conduct airstrikes in Yemen and its extraordinary missile defense capabilities against attacks by the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iran have further contributed to its image.
The Turkish government has also accused Israel of turning the conflict in Gaza into a full-scale regional war.[xviii] Erdoğan has stated that Israel will not stop at Gaza. In his conspiracy theory-driven worldview, after completing operations in Gaza, Israel will continue its military campaign in Lebanon, expand them to Syria, and might even attack Turkey in pursuit of its so-called “Promised Land” vision.[xix]On July 28, Erdoğan escalate his rhetoric further, threatening to “enter Israel” in the same way Turkey had acted in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya.[xx]
While Erdoğan’s declarations are not taken seriously by opposition circles, his party and allied media constantly propagate the idea that after Gaza and Lebanon, Israel will not hesitate to open a new front against Turkey. Since there is no territorial contiguity between Israel and Turkey, pro-Erdoğan media have recently begun to portray the Kurdish PKK as “Israel’s collaborator.”[xxi] The slogans chanted during the latest pro-Palestinian demonstration in the city of Diyarbakır, equating the Kurdish PKK with Israel, have highlighted the effectiveness of this propaganda. Erdoğan’s calculated use of terms such “Zionist terrorist organization”[xxii] reinforces the notion of the supposed collaboration between the PKK and Israel. Thus, once again, Israel is perceived as the “mysterious mastermind” behind potential covert action against Turkey’s territorial integrity.
The main goal of this narrative is to neutralize all opposition, primarily the CHP, and activate the “state’s survival” (in Turkish: “Beka siyaseti”) reflex –a social discourse that does not provide any room for public debate on issues other than national security. This strategy succeeds in diverting the public’s attention from rising public violence against women and the worsening economy in Turkey, shifting the discourse to the country’s ‘survival’.
The government in Ankara also appears to be concerned about the changing balance of power in the region. The weakening of Iran and Hezbollah could create an unfavorable situation for the Assad regime in Syria, potentially presenting new opportunities for the PYD-YPG, the PKK’s offshoots in northern Syria –groups that Ankara considers to be terrorist entities.
Moreover, the possibility of regime change in Iran as a result of direct conflict between Israel and has triggered alarm bells in Ankara. While Ankara is not fond of the mullahs, its core concern remains Iran’s territorial integrity. From Turkey’s perspective, the disintegration of Iran could set a dangerous precedent for secessionists within its own borders. Despite its dislike for the regime itself, Ankara does not want any surprises in Iran either.
Conclusion
The deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations under President Erdoğan reflects both ideological inclinations and calculated political maneuvers that intertwine domestic and foreign policies. By framing Israel as a national security threat and emphasizing solidarity with the Palestinian cause, Erdoğan has shifted national discourse away from pressing internal issues such as the worsening economy and societal violence. This tactic has helped the government consolidate power by rallying nationalist and Islamist sentiments, while neutralizing opposition voices, particularly from the CHP. The government’s rhetoric and policies toward Israel, including suspension of trade and diplomatic measures, appeal to its conservative base and serve to strengthen control over Islamist circles in the face of internal political challenges.
At the same time, Ankara is increasingly concerned about the shifting regional balance of power. The potential weakening of Iran and Hezbollah could destabilize Syria, leading to gains for Kurdish groups in northern Syria, something that Turkey views as a major security threat. Additionally, the prospect of counter-revolution in Iran has raised alarm bells in Ankara, as any fragmentation of Iran’s territorial integrity could embolden separatist movements within Turkey. Thus, Erdoğan’s foreign policy moves are not solely about challenging Israel but also about navigating broader regional dynamics that could have significant implications for Turkey’s own security and political stability.
[i] “TBMM yeni yasama yılına başladı: Özel oturumda neler yaşandı, Erdoğan hangi mesajları verdi?”, BBC Türkçe, October 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c8elxx3zyl2o [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[ii] “TBMM’de ‘İsrail’ konulu kapalı oturum: Konuşulanlar 10 yıl süreyle saklı tutulacak”, Euronews, October 8, 2024, https://tr.euronews.com/2024/10/08/tbmmde-israil-konulu-kapali-oturum-konusulanlar-10-yil-sureyle-sakli-tutulacak [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[iii] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu’yu kabul etti”, AA, September 20, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-basbakani-netanyahuyu-kabul-etti/2996348 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[iv] “Erdoğan’dan Hamas’a Kuvayı Milliye benzetmesi: Bunu söylemenin bedeli olduğunu farkındayız”, T24, April 17, 2024, https://t24.com.tr/haber/canli-erdogan-akp-grup-toplantisinda-konusuyor,1160859 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[v] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İsrail ile aramızdaki 9,5 milyar dolarlık ticaret hacmini yok farz ederek bu kapıyı kapattık”, AA, May 3, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-ile-aramizdaki-9-5-milyar-dolarlik-ticaret-hacmini-yok-farz-ederek-bu-kapiyi-kapattik/3209072 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[vi] “Turkey gave Hamas members passports, Israel says”, Ynet, August 26, 2020, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/B1Z00LXVmw [Accessed: October 13, 2024]
[vii] “THY’den İsrail kararı! Seferlere ara verildi”, Milliyet, October 0, 2023,
https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/thyden-israil-karari-seferlere-ara-verildi-7018018 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[viii] “Türkiye, İsrail’le ticarete kısıtlama getirdi: 54 ürün grubunda ihracata sınır”, April 9, 2024, https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/turkiye-israille-ticarete-kisitlama-getirdi,mmDjCAuU1kSjs-_-7Vo1XA [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[ix] “İsrail’le ticaret tamamen durduruldu”, BloombergHT, May 2, 2024, https://www.bloomberght.com/israille-ticaret-tamamen-durduruldu-2352057 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[x] Ragıp Soylu, “Turkey local elections: How Erdogan’s Israel policy backfired”, Middle East Eye, April 5, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-local-elections-erdogan-israel-policy-backfired-how [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xi] Dean Shmuel Elmas, “Turkish exports to “Palestine” skyrocket”, Globes, August 7, 2024, https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-turkish-exports-to-palestine-skyrocket-1001486160 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xii] “Türkiye İsrail’e karşı ‘soykırım’ davasına müdahil olmak için başvurdu, şimdi ne olacak?”, BBC Türkçe, August 7, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cq5ddyljgydo [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xiii] “Oktar’ın İsrail’in maşası olduğu kanıtlandı”, Milat, February 19, 2024, https://www.milatgazetesi.com/haber/oktarin-israilin-masasi-oldugu-kanitlandi-1641/ [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xiv] “Bu terör devleti yok edilmeli”, Yeni Şafak, October 18, 2024, https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/bu-teror-devleti-yok-edilmeli-4568401 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xv] “İşgalci devlet El Halil’de sokağa çıkma yasağı uyguladı”, Haber 7, October 3, 2024, https://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/3465566-isgalci-devlet-el-halilde-sokaga-cikma-yasagi-uyguladi [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xvi] “Dünya bu virüsü yok etmeli: Gazze’deki katliamların sapkın arka planı”, Yeni Şafak, December 8, 2023, https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/dunya-bu-virusu-yok-etmeli-gazzedeki-katliamlarin-sapkin-arka-plani-4580082 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xvii] “Siyonazi İsrail’i eleştiren akademisyenlerin peşinde: Tel Aviv’i kınayana ödül yok”, Takvim, November 8, 2023, https://www.takvim.com.tr/dunya/siyonazi-israili-elestiren-akademisyenlerin-pesinde-tel-avivi-kinayana-odul-yok-5693853 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xviii] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: ‘İsrail savaşı bölgeye yayıyor’”, İHA, September 23, 2024, https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-savasi-bolgeye-yayiyor-1188665 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xix] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İsrail gözünü Türkiye’ye dikecek”, Gazete Oksijen, October 1, 2024, https://gazeteoksijen.com/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-gozunu-turkiyeye-dikecek-224300 [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xx] “Erdoğan: “Biz nasıl Karabağ, Libya’ya girdiysek İsrail’e de gireriz””, Şalom, July 29, 2024, https://www.salom.com.tr/haber/134177/erdogan-biz-nasil-karabag-libyaya-girdiysek-israile-de-gireriz [Accessed: October 10, 2024]
[xxi] “Diyarbakır’da ‘katil İsrail işbirlikçi PKK’ sloganları yankılandı”, October 6, 2024, https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/diyarbakirda-katil-israil-isbirlikci-pkk-sloganlari-yankilandi-4648931 [Accessed: October 9, 2024]
[xxii] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Kriminal tipler sokakta dolaşmamalı”, October 9, 2024, Yeni Şafak, https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-kriminal-tipler-sokakta-dolasmamali-4649486 [Accessed: October 9, 2024]
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
