Turkey’s relations with Sweden and Finland are at a crossroads, and it behooves all three countries to proceed with sensitivity to protect their national interests
Under the impact of the war in Ukraine, Sweden and Finland ended their decades-long foreign policy orientation in May 2022 by applying for NATO membership. Perceiving Russian expansionism as an imminent threat, 28 out of 30 NATO members ratified their membership. However, despite this overwhelming support within NATO, the Nordic expansion did not go through due to Turkish and Hungarian[1] opposition.
Following the recent Koran-burning demonstration by the Danish far-right politician Rasmus Paludan in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm, the Nordic nations’ NATO bid faces more resistance. The location of the demonstration and the Islamophobic act turned the incident into a national-religious cause for the Turkish leadership. Given the countdown to the Turkish general election on May 14, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will not likely miss this opportunity to rally his people around the flag. Moreover, the Turkish constitution allows Erdoğan to wait and not pass any international treaty for the parliament’s ratification until he sees it is suitable, providing Turkey’s president room for maneuver. In the best-case scenario, Stockholm and Helsinki will not be able to enjoy the NATO umbrella until the end of May.
This article analyzes the current status of Turkey’s relations with Sweden and Finland.
The nature of Turkey’s relations with Sweden and Finland
Given the geographic distance between Turkey and Scandinavia, relations among the three nations since the formal foundation of bilateral ties in 1924 were primarily conducted in the framework of international organizations and not through bilateral channels.
Despite bilateral relations between Turkey and Sweden being upgraded to the level of strategic partnership in 2013, suggesting both countries would cooperate on national security matters, and given the status of the bilateral relations during the last decade, this declaration, in retrospect, can be considered nothing but lip service since no concrete action was taken by the two to describe the relationship to that extent.[2]
The same can be said for Finnish-Turkish relations. Since the establishment of bilateral ties, Helsinki only chose to open an embassy in Ankara in 1959 and honorary consulates in various cities in Turkey – including Turkey’s economic capital, Istanbul.[3]
Regarding international organizations, cooperation under the UN’s “Friends of Mediation Group” – which seeks to increase UN efficiency and capacity in peace-building – can be considered constructive because the three nations managed to cooperate on various projects, like organizing annual conferences for increasing the awareness for international peace building by enhancing meditation.[4]
However, the same harmony cannot be seen in Turkey’s European Union accession process. The Nordic neighbors’ critique of the Turkish government, especially on democracy and human rights, remains the source of tension between the parties.
For example, following the July 2016 failed coup, Sweden criticized Turkey for the mass arrests across the country.[5] Turkey then refuted the critiques by explaining that the arrests were necessary to neutralize Fethullah Gülen’s movement, which has since been considered a terrorist organization by Ankara. However, Swedish public opinion was not satisfied by the Turkish argument. Days before the first anniversary of the failed coup attempt, Stockholm Center for Freedom accused the Turkish president of orchestrating the July events to crush his opponents.[6]
The tension was not solely limited to the failed coup attempt. Following the Turkish constitutional court’s July 2016 decision to abolish part of the country’s criminal code that classifies sexual acts with children under 15 as “sexual abuse,” Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström confronted Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu openly.[7]
Constant Swedish criticism – which was perceived in Turkish eyes as intervening in Turkey’s internal affairs – combined with Stockholm’s policy of absorbing Gülenist journalists and hosting the PKK members while allowing them to organize mass demonstrations in public have deteriorated relations further.
This negative trend accelerated when Turkey launched three consecutive ground operations in northern Syria in 2016, 2018, and 2019. Unsurprisingly, the Swedish and Finnish criticism of Turkey escalated. In 2019, Stockholm and Helsinki separately enacted an arms embargo against Ankara.[8] In Turkey’s eyes, the act was unacceptable as Turkey launched operations against ISIS and the PYD, considered an offshoot of the terrorist PKK – which is itself regarded as a terrorist organization not only by Turkey but also by the US and the EU. However, despite the Turkish justification for the military operations, the EU, in general, and particularly Sweden and Finland, view the PYD as a separate entity from the PKK. They even appreciate it due to its fight against ISIS.
Swedish-Finnish NATO bid and Turkey
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created an earthquake in Sweden and Finland’s national security perception. Having felt threatened by Russia, both Nordic countries changed their neutrality and sought to enjoy NATO protection. However, Stockholm and Helsinki have neglected considering Turkey’s membership in NATO.
Admission into the alliance requires the approval of all members. The unanimity required provided Turkey unprecedented leverage vis-à-vis the Nordic states.
Despite being at odds with the two, Turkey signaled a green light for NATO’s Nordic expansion by signing the tripartite Madrid protocols on June 29, 2022. However, this green light was conditional. Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland collaborate in its war against terrorism. Turkey presented its demands for the extradition of Gülenists and the Kurdish PKK members, limiting these entities’ activities in those two countries. In addition, Sweden and Finland had to end their arms embargo against Turkey. Indeed, Sweden[9] in October 2022 and Finland in January 2023 lifted their arms embargo against Turkey.[10]
However, Ankara’s extradition demand for 120 suspects was not entirely accepted. Sweden tends to adopt an ambivalent policy of categorizing the issue as “deporting” and “extradition.” According to Swedish law, the body which decides on deportations is the Swedish Immigration Authority.[11] The PKK suspects who seek to acquire Swedish citizenship or have a permit to stay but have not yet been given citizenship are “deported” to Turkey. For instance, on December 3, Sweden handed over Mahmut Tat, a PKK affiliate, to Turkey.[12] However, the ones awarded political asylum or a residence permit in Sweden were in a different legal category. They could not be deported, only “extradited.” In such a case, the Swedish Immigration Authority cannot act independently but needs to receive approval from the court to implement the extradition. In the case of the Gülenist journalist Bülent Keneş, the Swedish court refused to extradite him to Turkey. Due to the judiciary’s independence, the Swedish government’s maneuvering ability is limited. Thus, Stockholm finds it challenging to satisfy Turkey in this matter. Indeed, Çavuşoğlu’s statement that Turkey needs to see concrete action rather than hearing nice words from Sweden reflects the situation.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson’s January 8 statement also underlines Sweden’s difficult position. The Swedish premier complained about “unacceptable Turkish demands that Sweden will never be able to deliver.”[13] As far as Finland’s position is concerned, Helsinki is far more cooperative in Ankara’s eyes. Between 2012 and 2022, Turkey filed 17 extradition requests to Finland. Helsinki met and finalized 16 of those requests.[14]
The Koran burning protest and the aftermath
Before the Islamophobic demonstration, Turkey urged Sweden not to permit the burning of the Koran since such an act cannot be viewed within the borders of freedom of expression. Despite Turkey’s explanation and request, the Swedish authorities allowed Paludan “to realize his democratic right to demonstrate” and to burn the Islamic holy book. While the spotlight was on Islamophobia, Swedish authorities allowed a controversial pro-PKK demonstration. These consecutive events turned into a political deadlock between Sweden and Turkey and, indirectly, with Finland. As far as Finland is concerned, Helsinki’s situation was no better – compared with Sweden – since it voluntarily attached its own NATO membership to Sweden’s admittance.[15] Despite this, Ankara seeks to put a wall between Stockholm and Helsinki in favor of Finland.[16]
As expected in the aftermath of Paludan’s burning of the Koran, President Erdoğan slammed Sweden for allowing an Islamophobic demonstration and accused Stockholm of disrespecting Islam. In an open sarcastic statement, Erdoğan asked the Swedish decision-makers to turn to Islamophobes and terrorists to safeguard their country’s national security since Turkey will not take any action as a member of NATO.[17] Following Erdoğan’s statement, Swedish Prime Minister Kristersson condemned the Koran-burning and tagged it as a disrespectful act, but did not say a word about the boundaries of freedom of speech.[18]
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Sweden became bolder when in the same week, on January 26, Swedish authorities did not allow an anti-Israel Egyptian protestor to burn the Torah scroll next to the Israel Embassy in Stockholm.[19] The Swedish decision was termed hypocritical by the Turkish media and deepened the rage against the Nordic country.[20]
Due to the public outcry, Ankara decided to indefinitely cancel the February tripartite meeting among Turkey, Sweden, and Finland, which was supposed to take place in Brussels. Despite the Turkish act, Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavis expressed optimism, stating that the scheduled meeting was only postponed for a few weeks.[21]
The US State Department also delivered a similar statement hinting that the meetings will be resumed soon.[22]
Following these statements, the diplomatic pressure on Turkey grew significantly. An article titled “NATO Shouldn’t Let Erdoğan Delay Expansion” appeared in Bloomberg, signed by “the editors.” The report argued that the tension between Turkey and Sweden endangered the security of Europe, and it accused only Turkey of acting stubbornly by preferring its narrow political interest above the alliance’s security. The authors called on the US administration to take action against Turkey, including halting F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. It also did not hesitate to call for Turkey’s expulsion from the alliance – despite the lack of such a mechanism in NATO.[23]
It seems that the January 24-dated statement of the State Department and the Bloomberg article managed to soften the Turkish position. The day after, on January 25, the press release of the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) meeting re-opened NATO’s doors to Sweden. The statement again urged Sweden “to fulfill its obligations” if it wanted to participate in the NATO alliance. The MGK once again highlighted Turkey’s demand to take action against the Gülen Movement and the PKK as well as its affiliates.[24] It should also be noted that in addition to the MGK statement, Turkish Minister Çavuşoğlu portrayed Sweden as a victim of the acts of the mysterious parties that collaborate with the PKK to hinder Sweden from taking part in NATO.[25]
Amid this political tension, Turkey was devastated on February 6 by two consecutive major earthquakes that resulted in more than 40,000 casualties. While this natural disaster had caused severe humanitarian tragedies, at the same time, it created a window of opportunity for the countries to mend their fences with Turkey. In this framework, both the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers expressed their solidarity with Turkey and highlighted their countries’ willingness to support the earthquake victims.[26]
Conclusion
Given the delicate nature of the relations between Sweden and Turkey, the Swedish authorities were counter-productive by turning a blind eye to Rasmus Paludan’s heinous hate crime.
The Swedish government had to remember the Jewish poet Heinrich Heine’s famous quote: “Where they burn books, they will, in the end, burn human beings too.” Bearing this in mind, the Swedish authorities, in the name of protecting democracy from the anti-system elements, had to ban potential Paludan-type Islamophobic acts, as they did against the Torah scroll burning attempt. Uniformity is required.
By enacting a law for protecting religious scripts and objects from harassment, Sweden should demonstrate an example that it does not adopt ethnocentrism but instead respects all religions.
Apart from this moral obligation, the Swedish decision-makers with such an act will also spare themselves the dilemma of whether to preserve democratic values or safeguard their country’s national security.
In the meantime, to proceed and finalize their NATO bid, Stockholm and Helsinki must show respect to Turkey, Islam, and Turkey’s current leadership. In addition, Sweden and Finland’s demonstration of solidarity right after the earthquake will most likely soften Turkey’s position and make it better understand Stockholm and Helsinki’s reservations on implementing some of the Turkish demands. These partial victories for the Swedish, Finnish, and Turkish decision-makers would be perceived as concrete gains at home. In short, it will be a win-win situation.
Implementing such a policy is not only required for the cohesion of the NATO alliance but also for Swedish, Finnish, and Turkish national interests.
[1] While Hungarian leadership is causing a headache to its other European partners due to significant disagreements on the refugee crisis and the border control policy, Victor Orban’s partnership with Turkey’s Erdogan in another security organization called the Organization of the Turkic States should not be ignored.
[2] “Türkiye-İsveç İlişkileri,” MFA Türkiye, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-isvec-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa [January 31, 2023]
[3] “Türkiye-Finlandiya İlişkileri,” MFA Türkiye, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-finlandiya-iliskileri-.tr.mfa [January 31, 2023]
[4] “Group of friends of mediation”, UN, https://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation [February 19, 2023]
[5] “Turkey clashes with Sweden over child sex accusation,” Politico, August 15, 2016 https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-clashes-with-sweden-over-child-sex-accusation/ [January 31, 2023]
[6]“A new report in Sweden reveals Erdoğan orchestrated July 15 coup in Turkey,” Stockholm Center for Freedom, July 5, 2017 https://stockholmcf.org/a-new-report-in-sweden-reveals-erdogan-orchestrated-july-15-coup-in-turkey/ [January 31, 2023]
[7] “Turkey clashes with Sweden over child sex accusation,” Politico, August 15, 2016 https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-clashes-with-sweden-over-child-sex-accusation/ [January 31, 2023]
[8] “İsveç ve Finlandiya, NATO’ya katılım için Türkiye’yi ikna edebilecek mi?,” BBC Türkçe, October 1, 2022 https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/crgxy0rejw3o [January 25, 2023]
[9] “İsveç ve Finlandiya, NATO’ya katılım için Türkiye’yi ikna edebilecek mi?” BBC Türkçe, October 1, 2022 https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/crgxy0rejw3o [January 25, 2023]
[10] “Finlandiya’dan flaş Türkiye adımı! Silah ambargosu kaldırıldı,” Milliyet, January 25, 2023 https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/finlandiyadan-flas-turkiye-adimi-silah-ambargosu-kaldirildi-6893600 [January 26, 2023]
[11] “Paul Levin: Türkiye, veto tehdidini Demokles’in kılıcı gibi elinde tutuyor,” Bianet, December 2, 2022 https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/270826-paul-levin-turkiye-veto-tehdidini-demokles-in-kilici-gibi-elinde-tutuyor [January 31, 2023]
[12] “Sweden hands PKK/KCK terror group member to Türkiye,” TRT World, December 3, 2022 https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/sweden-hands-pkk-kck-terror-group-member-to-t%C3%BCrkiye-63165 [January 26, 2023]
[13] “İsveç Başbakanı: Türkiye, NATO üyeliği için kabul edemeyeceğimiz taleplerde bulunuyor,” BBC Türkçe, January 8, 2023 https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c51g0qy1x3yo [January 25, 2023]
[14] “Finlandiya, ekim ayında Türkiye’nin istediği bir kişiyi daha iade etti,” Euronews, January 23, 2023 https://tr.euronews.com/2023/01/23/finlandiya-ekim-ayinda-turkiyenin-istedigi-bir-kisiyi-daha-iade-etti [February 5, 2023]
[15] “Başbakan ‘Karşılayamayacağız Talepler’ Dedi: İsveç’in NATO Üyeliği Karşısında Türkiye Neler İstedi?” Onedio, January 8, 2023 https://onedio.com/haber/basbakan-karsilayamayacagiz-talepler-dedi-isvec-in-nato-uyeligi-karsisinda-turkiye-neler-istedi-1119726 [January 31, 2023]
[16] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan İsveç açıklaması: Finlandiya ile ilgili farklı bir mesaj verebiliriz İsveç şok olacak,” Hürriyet, January 30, 2023 https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-bilecikte-gencler-ile-bulusuyor-42211746 [January 26, 2023]
[17] “SON DAKİKA! Başkan Erdoğan’dan İsveç’te Kur’an-ı Kerim yakılmasına tepki: NATO konusunda bizden destek yok!” Sabah, January 23, 2023 https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2023/01/23/son-dakika-baskan-erdogandan-isvecte-kuran-i-kerim-yakilmasina-tepki-nato-konusunda-bizden-destek-yok?paging=3 [January 25, 2023]
[18] “İsveç Başbakanı Kristersson: Saygısızca bir davranış,” DHA, January 22, 2023 https://www.dha.com.tr/dunya/isvec-basbakani-kristersson-saygisizca-bir-davranis-2194249 [January 31, 2023]
[19] “Anti-Israel Protest Intended to Burn Torah Scroll Canceled in Stockholm,” Jewish Press, January 26, 2023 https://www.jewishpress.com/news/jewish-news/antisemitism-news/anti-israel-protest-intended-to-burn-torah-scroll-canceled-in-stockholm/2023/01/26/ [January 31, 2023]
[20] “Sweden’s hypocrisy exposed as protest outside Israeli embassy averted,” https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/sweden-s-hypocrisy-exposed-as-protest-outside-israeli-embassy-averted-64927 [January 31, 2023]
[21] “Türkiye, İsveç ve Finlandiya toplantısı süresiz olarak iptal edildi,” Sözcü, January 24, 2023 https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2023/dunya/turkiye-isvec-ve-finlandiya-toplantisi-suresiz-olarak-iptal-edildi-7567667/ [January 25, 2023]
[22] “ABD’den Türkiye, İsveç ve Finlandiya açıklaması,” CNN Türk, January 25, 2023 https://www.cnnturk.com/video/dunya/abdden-turkiye-isvec-ve-finlandiya-aciklamasi [January 25, 2023]
[23] “NATO Shouldn’t Let Erdogan Delay Expansion,” Bloomberg, January 24, 2023 https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-24/nato-can-t-let-erdogan-block-sweden-finland-membership [January 26, 2023]
[24] “MGK bildirisi yayımlandı! İsveç’e çok net NATO mesajı,” Milliyet, January 25, 2023 https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/yilin-ilk-mgksi-sona-erdi-yazili-aciklama-geldi-6893591 [January 26, 2023]
[25] “Son dakika… Bakan Çavuşoğlu: ‘İsveç’teki bu alçak eylem bir nefret suçudur, ırkçı bir eylemdir’,” CNN Türk, January 26, 2023 https://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/son-dakika-bakan-cavusoglu-isvecteki-bu-alcak-eylem-bir-nefret-sucudur-irkci-bir-eylemdir [January 25, 2023]
[26] “Finlandiya ve İsveç’ten Türkiye’ye destek açıklamaları,” NTV, February 7, 2023 https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/finlandiya-ve-isvecten-turkiyeye-destek-aciklamalari,Yjw0OSQDbUWhc1tdZz3DBQ [January 25, 2023]
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