President Donald Trump, his key foreign policy and national security officials, as well as the U.S. military establishment –which constitutes an element of continuity as the new administration takes shape – will soon face an acute strategic challenge: the need to reverse and disable Iran’s military nuclear project. The Government of Israel should prepare to engage with Washington in the early days of the new administration, at a time in which there is a real prospect of American military action. The future of the region, and of the global order, may hinge on their success. Given Trump’s self-promoted image as a “deal maker,” the necessary step before the almost inevitable use of force would be to present the regime in Tehran, already reeling from a strategic defeat in Syria and economic troubles at home, — with an ultimatum demanding far reaching concessions. This ultimatum should demand an agreement far stricter than the JCPOA of 2015, with no “sunset clauses”, and it must further include provisions for a halt to the violent activities of Iran’s proxies, including Houthi attacks on shipping. There is obviously no prospect of such an ultimatum being endorsed by the UN Security Council, due to the position of China and Russia, key European partners (the E3) should support the U.S. in this demand Their backing would help create the conditions for effective action against Iran, if it were to reject this demand. An overt warning of this nature would not diminish the prospects of successful military action, if necessary. The element of surprise that was so crucial when Israel struck Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, has long since dissipated in the case of Iran due to open discussions of the military option both in Israel and in the U.S.
Donald Trump and his team signal deep concern over Iran’s nuclear option
During the election campaign, and in the lead-up to his inauguration, President Donald Trump and his key national security and foreign policy appointees made it clear that they view Iran’s nuclear project as a threat to American and global security. Incoming National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio bring extensive Congressional experience to their roles; Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth has voiced strong opinions on the issue; and within the U.S. military – an element of continuity in Washington – the key voice is that of CENTCOM Commander, General Michael Kurilla, who maintains an intense dialog with his colleagues in Israel.
Waltz, a former U.S. Representative for Florida’s 6th district and a former Special Forces colonel in the reserves has consistently taken a firm public stance against Iran and its proxies drawing on . his past experience as a counter-terrorism expert. Waltz recently warned that Iranian-backed terrorists and subversive elements would pose a far greater danger to regional stability if backed by an Iranian nuclear capability.
Marco Rubio, who served as Senator for Florida for 14 years and was a contender for the Republican nomination for president in 2016, has been adamant and consistent in his support of Israel and against Iran. A fierce critic of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord, he has backed a maximum pressure strategy against Iran and has also expressed his unequivocal view that the suffering in Gaza is entirely due to the actions of Hamas. While Pete Hegseth lacks policy-making or legislative experience, his views as expressed when he was a Fox News commentator, and again during his confirmation hearing, reflect firm support for Israel and its war on Hamas. As for Iran, he is on record openly advocating for the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites, even if this were to result in collateral damage to civilian targets.
John Ratcliffe, Trump’s nominee for director of the CIA, , a former U.S. Representative for Texas’s 4th District and briefly Director of National Intelligence in the prior Trump administration is also a firm supporter of Israel’s position and criticized the Biden administration’s attitude towards Iran.
This partial list highlights the new administration’s commitment to an assertive international and Middle East policy, despite isolationist sentiments that surfaced during the election campaign — most notably in statements by Vice President J.D. Vance opposing the use of force. It should be borne in mind that the President’s moods are mercurial and liable to change, sometimes radically; and his personal perspectives cannot be predicted with any certainty.
Nevertheless, he and his team will likely find themselves sooner rather than later needing to act on Iran and the implications of its nuclear program for Israel’s security the stability of the region and the global order. This urgency stems from the accelerating pace of Iranian uranium enrichment and the growing signs of economic distress, as well as growing social and political unrest in Iran. In the first post-election meeting between Biden and Trump, the Iranian challenge came up as a top priority, with both leaders defining Iran as the most dangerous active threat to U.S. security — even if China is the ultimate strategic challenge in the long run. Clearly, this perspective is shared by the key foreign policy players in the new administration.
Israel should play a (discreet) role in presenting an ultimatum to Iran
At the earliest possible point, despite the new administration’s focus on the questions of immigration, tariffs, oil drilling and the Panama Canal, it is crucial for Israel to engage with it on the issue of Iran – bearing in mind the president’s commitment to “end wars”, but also his desire to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. There is reason to believe that Trump, who views himself as an aggressive, manipulative and effective negotiator, able leveraging fear to obtain results will first try to pursue a deal with Iran . Israel’s vital interest is to ensure that any such deal is strict enough to bring the Iranian project to a halt, reverse its progress and prevent any further advance toward a military nuclear capability.
To this end, it will be essential to coordinate discreetly with the U.S., while at the same time engaging, if possible, with the European JCPOA partners, (Germany, Britain and France), who recently expressed their deep and growing concern over Iran’s accelerating accumulation of fissile material. The goal should be the presentation of a firm and unequivocal ultimatum to Iran, complete with a clear deadline. The U.S., and ideally all four powers, should demand:
- A total halt to all enrichment activity and the extraction from Iran of all its accumulated uranium stocks above a level of 4% U235.
- In the long term, even if some symbolic enrichment activity would still be allowed, all enriched uranium should be removed from Iran and stored under supervision for civilian use only, ensuring no further accumulation.
- A much more intrusive mandate for IAEA inspections.
- The removal of the “sunset clauses” (time limits) in the JCPOA that made it into essentially an interim measure, rather than a permanent agreement.
- Reaffirmation and enforcement of UNSCR 2231 (July 2015) which among other provisions prohibited all ballistic missile activity by Iran. This provision was blithely ignored by Iran and allowed to lapse in October 2023 – even if the U.S. and its allies continued to impose restrictions on missile-related exports to Iran.
- The cessation of terror activities by Iran’s proxies – or rather, those which are still functional – such as the Houthis in Yemen, who pose a threat to Israel’s population centers as well as to the world’s shipping lanes.
As much as possible, these efforts should be coordinated with the Saudis. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s recent blunt statements against Israel by should not be taken at face value. They are part of a complex give-and-take between the Crown Prince and Washington, which include the option of an American guarantee securing Saudi Arabia as well as the Saudi role in the Palestinian context. Given Trump’s blunt transactional approach to international relations, the Saudis are bound to have significant influence on his policies, as they did in 2017-2021, but Israel has levers of its own, since it would be next to impossible to obtain the necessary 67 Senate votes for ratification of a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia without due attention to the interests of Israel. The latter would need to include some curbs on Saudi nuclear activities, further progress towards the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations, and above all, the common interest of both countries: effective action against Iran.
The ultimatum as a precursor to military action
It is equally important to ensure, in the context of close consultations with President Trump and his team, that the above demands are not just the opening bid in a prolonged and manipulative negotiation with the Iranians. The latter are masterful practitioners of the art of delay and dilution of the original proposal made to them. The ultimatum should be “take it or leave it” with a short expiration period.
|Given the positions of Russia and China (as well as countries in the “Global South”) there is no prospect of such an ultimatum being endorsed by the Security Council, as was the case in November 1990, when Saddam was told to leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991 or face military action (UNSCR 678). However, should the E-3 join the U.S., this would lend weight to the ultimatum and at the same time same time allow Britain, France and Germany, as well as Trump, to claim they have given diplomacy a chance.
As things stand, the likelihood of Iran accepting such terms is not high. President Pezeshkian is already under fire for even suggesting a negotiated outcome. For Iranian hardliners, Trump is the man who ordered the death of Qassem Suleimani. Thus, making an overt and unambiguous presentation – claiming to seek an agreement and avoid the use of force – will align well with Trump’s self-image and satisfy Israel’s need for legitimacy, if it decides to use force (either alone or with the U.S. and other partners).
Obviously, presenting an ultimatum with a clear timeline will reduce the element of surprise should the time come for military action. In past instance, surprise was a key factor in the highly successful strikes by Israel against nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007). Yet when it comes to Iran, this factor is less relevant, since it has already crossed the line and is engaged in active hostilities with Israel (the missile barrages of April and October 2024). Moreover, the Iranian leadership is well aware of the fact that a military option is actively being discussed in both Jerusalem and Washington. However, Tehran’s ability to fend off or deter Israel from taking such action has been greatly reduced. Iran’s air defenses have been degraded by the IAF, while the ability to threaten a massive retaliation through its proxy forces has also been eroded by the fate of Hezbollah and Hamas.
Will the mounting pressure have the effect of driving Iran to accelerate its nuclear program and shorten its “break out” time? While some reports suggest that option is being weighed in Tehran, the assumption should be that the regime is acutely aware of the depth of Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iran in general and its nuclear program specifically. As a result, they cannot trust a break-out to be undertaken undetected. The United States and Israel should make it unequivocally clear to Iran that any attempt to initiate breakout would immediately trigger extensive military action.
Mapping the New Threats
Alongside the far-reaching benefits that Israel has identified amid the new situation in Syria, it has also quickly come to recognize the need to pre-empt and prepare for problematic and even dangerous challenges that may arise given the nature of the forces now vying for power in Damascus. Three aspects of the emerging political dynamic in Syria could interact posing serious risks:
- Chaos: Although the rebels appear to have established some command structures (“operation rooms”) and have an emerging leadership under Ahmad Hussein al-Shar’a, also known as “Abu Muhammad al-Julani” (a nomme de guerre that has uncomfortable associations for Israel as Julani means “from the Golan”), there are serious doubts about their ability to impose law and order or maintain unity. This may be the reason for their willingness to work with elements of the existing government, at least during a transitional period. Rebel factions may well descend into a violent struggle for power, as happened in Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi . With the Syrian Army no longer existing after its soldiers and officers took off their uniforms and vanished, there is no central authority capable of restoring order. Meanwhile, minority groups such as the Druze, Kurds, and Alawites (even if the latter were quick to repudiate the Assad clan) may take up arms to defend their semi-autonomous regions. All the above sets the stage for prolonged violence which may well spread over the border.
- Islamist Radicalism: Despite occasional moderate and encouraging statements about tolerance and women’s rights, there should be no illusions about the ideological orientation of key rebel elements, including those led by Julani. Many of these are Sunni radicals reared in the school of thought of al-Qaeda and ISIL, even if they have rebranded under names such as Jabhat al-Nusra (“Front of the Faithful”) and “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (The organization for the liberation of the Levant – “Sham” is a term that covers not just Syria but Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine). As totalitarian Islamists, they are unlikely to enable the practice of democratic freedoms. Over time, despite their present protestations to the contrary, they may attempt to impose a strict regime of Sharia law over a population which in addition to significant non-Muslim minorities also has a large Sunni secular sector. In such an event, hostility toward Israel, or at least reviving the demand for the return of the Golan to Syria, may well serve their ideological and political interests. While there were expressions of enthusiasm for Israel’s actions among the rebels during the war in Lebanon and following the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, these were confined to the Idlib enclave where Hezbollah and Iran were seen as Assad’s willing helpers. However, such sentiments should not be interpreted as a guarantee for their positions in the (near) future.
- Turkish hegemony: The government in Ankara was at first wary of being overly identified with the rebel offensive and was seen as willing to discuss the future of Syria with Russia and Iran, within the context of the Astana Process. However, as the rebels gained momentum, Erdogan showed greater willingness to be openly supportive of the rebels and dismissive of Assad – as he has in fact been all along. A scenario whereby the present Turkish leadership plays a major role in shaping Syria’s future – potentially become drawn into the military balance (as happened in Libya) should chaotic conditions persist – raises concerns for Israel in view of Erdogan hostility to the Jewish State and his backing of Hamas. This is likely also of concern to other regional actors such as Jordan, Egypt and the UAE, who do not want to see a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood and forces associated with it , or to accept “Neo-Ottoman” hegemony.
The Israeli Response – Military and Diplomatic
Inevitably, Israel’s first – and massive – response was military. Within days, Israel launched Operation “Bashan Arrow” (Bashan is the biblical name for the area known today as the Golan Heights). The operations saw the Israeli Air Force and Navy destroy almost all of the Syrian Air Force and the country’s air defenses (once considered among the densest in the world) and navy. The operations also created a new line of defense east of the previous 1974 separation line, encompassing key positions such as the highest point of Mount Hermon. Since Russian forces are no longer defending the Syrian regime, Israel is now free of the need to sustain the deconfliction procedures agreed in 2015 and can unleash the IAF to strike hundreds of targets all over Syria based on extensive intelligence penetration. Israel has also delivered unequivocal messages to the new powers that be in Damascus that Israel wishes them no harm but will respond forcefully if threatened.
This position aligns with the four conditions set by the outgoing U.S. administration for recognition of the new Syrian regime (bearing in mind that HTS is still designated as a terrorist organizations): an inclusive non-sectarian government in line with UNSCR 2254; full respect for the rights of minorities; preventing the use of Syrian territory as a base for terrorism “or posing a threat to its neighbors”; and ensuring the full elimination of all chemical and biological weapons.
While Israel should be satisfied with these requirements, as outlined by Secretary of State Blinken on December 10, 2024, it is critical that it engage with President Trump’s team to ensure that the new administration, despite its isolationist streak, does not abandon the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to their fate – i.e., to Erdogan’s tender mercies. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on its own is no match for the SDF’s military capabilities and the Kurdish unit, unlike Assad’s forces will not fold). Key U.S. senators intimately familiar with the issue should be encouraged to take a strong stance. Kurdish control of key strategic positions in Rojava, northeastern Syria, remains of vital importance, serving as a counterbalance to the potential resurgence of Islamist forces, and as a guarantee against further instability and attempts at intervention by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
Another diplomatic corollary to military action should involve close coordination with Jordan, which may well fear efforts to spread the revolution further south. In this respect, Jordan possesses its own tools of influence (and interest in repatriation) vis-à-vis the Sunnis of southern Syria, who played a decisive role in the final assault on Damascus. Jordan can also be instrumental in preserving the current semi-autonomous Druze security of zone in the Suweida region. Israel for its part has its own channels of communications based on the common bonds of the Druze in the Gallilee, the Israeli Golan, and villagers on the other side of the frontline.
Looking to the long-term prospects, Israel should engage in dialogue with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as with Egypt, which shares similar concerns. None of these countries want to see Syria dominated by Turkey and Qatar. The UAE and Saudi Arabia hold considerable leverage as the reconstruction of Syria and the repatriation of millions of refugees displaced by the war – whom Assad did not want to see returning – will require immense resources. This economic lever can be used to influence the choices made Syria’s emerging political order .
The position of the Alawite minority in their redoubts in the northwest presents a complex challenge. While the Alawites have been assured they will remain unharmed, as long as they disown their links to the Assad clan, they are unlikely to feel safe given the vengeful sentiments among many Syrians. . Israel is in no position to be of help in this matter. Still, as the American position suggests, the more secure they and other minorities feel in the new Syria, the less danger there is of further acts of slaughter – and the easier it will become to fully isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon and block off all avenues for the reconstruction of its military capabilities.
Two Further Observations
As Trump expressed in a long and forceful tweet, it is “Russia, Russia, Russia” which should draw far-reaching conclusions from its defeat. The endless and ultimately futile war in Ukraine has bled Russia, leaving it weaker, not stronger: Trump’s aversion to all wars could not be more evident. For years, Russian protection of Assad served as living proof that it was Moscow, not Washington, that knew how to take care of its clients. No longer. This outcome should prompt Moscow to consider that the time has come to end the war – and perhaps use the opportunity, provided by the impending change of government and of orientation in Washington, to reset relations with the U.S. and the West and avoid the steady decline toward the paltry position of a Chinese strategic sidekick.
Meanwhile, the unfolding drama in Syria has demonstrated that such events do not proceed in a linear fashion – a slow and steady decline – but erupt as a fast-breaking and dynamic crisis when all the relevant factors come together at the decisive moment. The failure to see this coming in Syria may also apply to those who dismiss the prospects of a similar (internal) collapse in Iran. Stability and brutal repression can overnight be overtaken by rapid disintegration and collapse of central authority. Seeking to bring about such a sequence of events in Iran – a local eruption that rapidly spirals out of control – is a worthy cause, even if there is no way of knowing in advance whether and when it could succeed, But meanwhile, it is also vital to prepare for a direct effort to destroy Iran’s military nuclear project, which Tehran has accelerated recently in response to Western pressures.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / NurPhoto
