Events in Syria, particularly the role played by rebel militias backed by Turkey, have once again strengthened the regional camp associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which lost ground in 2013, when President Muhammad Mursi was overthrown in Egypt. While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is not a direct offshoot of the MB, the role played by Turkey and Qatar – the persistent supporters of the Ikhwan (Arabic for the Brotherhood) and their bid for regional power – highlights the issue of Western attitudes toward the MB in general, and its potential ascendancy in regional affairs. This is a matter of concern for Egypt and Jordan, as well as Israel’s Abraham Accords partners. A firm position – including legislation – identifying the MB as a threat, potentially associated with terror, and as a subversive element among Muslim communities in the US and Europe, could curb its influence. Such measures would send a clear message to Qatar and Turkey, warning them not to overplay their hand. Specifically, a Turkish invasion in northern Syria, and Qatari meddling in internal affairs in the region and beyond need to be curbed and deterred, as long as their ideological positions remain associated with the MB and its world view.
The Muslim Brotherhood: A Totalitarian Movement
Some in the West have fallen prey to a misperception, propagated by organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the United States who act as advocates of the Muslim Brotherhood. Given the willingness of the Brotherhood movement and its affiliates to take part in competitive elections – such as Hamas in 2006, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s “mother movement” Egypt in 2012 – analysts and journalists came to perceive them, and the “front” parties they created, as legitimate political forces participating in a democratic process. Yet democrats they are not. For the Muslim Brotherhood, political participation was and is a means, not an end. The MB’s creed is obviously rooted in aspects of Islamic traditions, but it is also knowingly modelled after the European totalitarian regimes and parties of the 20th century. So is the term al-Murshid al-‘Am, the General Guide (literally, Fuhrer) used to denote the leader of the MB.
This paper is not an abbreviated history of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun or an exposition of its ideology. Suffice to say that the Brotherhood is historically a hybrid product of the crisis of Islam a century ago, following the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1924, and coinciding with the rise of totalitarian political models – Bolshevism in the Soviet Union, Fascism in Italy and Spain and Nazism in Germany. The Brotherhood’s founder, Hasan al-Banna, incorporated the concepts of society unified under one leadership, organized for political change, albeit in the name of the Islamic Ummah (community of believers) rather than class, nation or race. The weakening appeal of the Egyptian parliamentary system fueled the Brotherhood’s momentum. By 1949, when al-Banna was assassinated, the MB was probably the strongest political force in Egypt.
Ultimately, it was only through military takeovers – in 1952 (followed by the repression of the MB in 1954) and again in July 2013 (followed by the brutal attack on the MB encampment in Rabi’ah al-‘Adawiyyah Square in August of that year) that the power of the Brotherhood was broken in Egypt. Its influence, however, has spread, regionally and globally, in the decades since its inception. Today, a direct offshoot of the Brotherhood holds power in the western part of Libya (as a dominant element of the GNA government in Tripoli) while Hamas, another self-defined MB affiliate, retains a foothold of governance in Gaza, even if its military capacity has been largely eliminated in the battles since October 2023. The situation in Syria is more complex: the MB elements which played a prominent role in the early stages of the rebellion have long ago been sidelined by more radical elements associated with al-Qaeda and by ISIL, however, they are still part of the winning coalition of forces, and are still backed by the AKP government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as by the Qatari ruling family, who for years have acted jointly as patrons of the MB and movements associated with it across the region.
Notably, and significantly, MB affiliates are also prominent among the representative organizations of Muslim communities in the West – including the United States, as previously noted. The teachings of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian MB-associated Islamist who took refuge in Qatar (where he died in 2022, aged 96) include a body of religious law for the practice of Islam in minority communities in the West – known as Fiqh al-Aqaliyyat. These teaching have been quite influential among Muslims in Europe and America.
The Need for a Firm Western Position
In the early years of the so-called “Arab Spring” – actually, a disastrous political upheaval that shattered regional stability and led to extensive violence in several countries – many in the West (though not Israel’s Hellenic neighbors, Greece and Cyprus, which had reasons to suspect any force supported by Turkey…) tended to take a benign view of the Brotherhood. The Obama Administration apparently saw in the Brotherhood a useful antidote to more extremist elements such as Da’esh (ISIL) and sought to build bridges with President Muhammad Mursi’s government in Egypt, as well as with Erdogan. Some key European players held similar views and reacted with dismay when Mursi was overthrown in July 2013. Moreover, the above-mentioned role of the MB or activists associated with it or with its ideas in Muslim community organizations in the US and Europe did not prevent such groups from gaining governmental recognition as legitimate interlocutors.
All this needs to change, if pro-Western countries in the region – above all Egypt and Jordan – are to be reassured about their long-term prospects in a volatile strategic environment. The confluence of events in the region – specifically, concerns about the ideological orientation of the new rulers in Damascus, the violent action of Islamists in campuses and on the streets, and political changes in the West – creates a window of opportunity to shift away from tolerance toward the MB and what it stands for.
This shift should be expressed through support for those in the region – and among Muslims in the diaspora – who espouse a truly liberal (or at least a non-totalitarian) interpretation of Islam. The positions and activities of MB-affiliated groups and organizations warrant thorough investigation, and legislative barriers should be erected to prevent the legitimization of such groups and their recognition as representatives of their communities. Where appropriate, – as we have seen in Germany and several other European countries – legal actions should be pursued against those fomenting hatred, including, when necessary, deportation. Furthermore, alternative views of Islam should be encouraged, in close coordination with tolerant regional regimes such as the UAE.
The Message to Turkey and Qatar
Alongside the direct benefits of such policies, they can also send a warning to Erdogan’s Turkey and to Qatar. Israel faces a complex challenge, and so do others in the region concerned about the rise of Turkish- and Qatari-backed forces. Turkey will not disappear as a major regional player, nor can its influence be broken in a manner similar to what was done against Iran. Ankara has the second largest military force in NATO, the largest economy in the region, and holds a key strategic position: it will remain a power to reckon with for the foreseeable future. As for Qatar, which has positioned itself as the indispensable go-between dealing with the crucial question of the hostages in Gaza, it has been able to buy for itself (quite literally) a strategic stance. Qatar hosts the largest U.S Air Force base in the region, as well as cultural and intellectual influence, – “soft power” – on university campuses in America and elsewhere. Israel’s ability to confront either country directly is limited.
Still, indirect ways to influence their choices should be found. Turkey and Qatar’s ability to exploit current circumstances to shape the region as they see fit must be curbed. Turkish military action against the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria would send a dangerous message, as would the continuation of Qatari subversion across the region, exemplified by the content of Al Jazeera’s Arabic broadcasts (in contrast to its English-language content). Both countries should be put on notice that future cooperation with the West – particularly with the unpredictable Trump administration – will be conditional upon the modification of their policies and of their ideological impact. In this context, an unambiguous stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots –including a coordinated effort by Israel, a U.S.-led multinational group, and relevant regional players, to replace Hamas rule in Gaza with a viable transitional administration – would help allay the present fears in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf. This would also send a message to Turkey and Qatar that to retain the support and tolerance of the U.S. and the West – on which their economies, and hence their political stability, ultimately depend – they must modify their conduct, re-assess their ideological associations, and scale back their regional ambitions
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