The ongoing developments in Syria — specifically the role still played by Islamist militias serving a regime backed by Turkey — have strengthened the hand of the regional camp associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (which lost ground back in 2013 when President Muhammad Mursi was overthrown in Egypt). While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is not a direct offshoot of the MB, the role played by Turkey and Qatar — persistent supporters of the Ikhwan (Arabic for the Brotherhood) and their bid for power in the region —highlights the question of Western attitudes towards the MB in general, and regarding their potential ascendancy in regional affairs. This worries Egypt and Jordan, as well as Israel’s Abraham Accords partners. A firm stance — currently being translated into legislation introduced by Senator Ted Cruz —identifying them as a threat, as potentially associated with terrorism, and as a subversive element within Muslim communities in the U.S. and Europe, could serve to curb their influence. It would also send a message to Qatar and Turkey, warning them not to overplay their hand. Specifically, a Turkish invasion in northern Syria and Qatari meddling in internal affairs in the region and beyond need to be curbed and deterred, as long as their ideological positions are associated with the MB and the movement’s worldview.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a Totalitarian Movement

Some in the West have fallen prey to a misperception, fed by organizations (such as CAIR in the United States) that act as advocates of the Muslim Brotherhood. Given the willingness of the Brotherhood movement and its affiliates to take part in competitive elections – as Hamas did in 2006 and the MB “mother movement” did in Egypt in 2012 – analysts and journalists came to see them, and the “front” parties they created, as legitimate political forces participating in a democratic process. Yet democrats they are not. Political participation was and is for them a vehicle, not a goal. The MB creed is obviously rooted in aspects of Islamic traditions, but it is also deliberately modeled on European totalitarian regimes and parties of the previous century. So is the term al-Murshid al-‘Am, the General “Guide” —literally, Führer — denoting their leader.

This paper is not intended as a platform for an abbreviated history of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun or as an exposition of their views: suffice it to say that they are historically a hybrid product of the crisis of Islam a century ago, following the abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk and the rise at about the same time of totalitarian political models – Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, Fascists in Italy and Spain, Nazis in Germany. The founder of the movement, Hasan al-Banna, incorporated the concepts of society unified under one leadership, organized for political change, albeit in the name of the Islamic Ummah (community of believers) rather than class, nation, or race. The weakening appeal of the Egyptian parliamentary system added to their momentum. By 1949, when al-Banna was assassinated, they were probably the strongest political force in Egypt.

Ultimately, it was only through military takeovers – in 1952 (followed by the repression of the MB in 1954) and again in July 2013 (followed by the brutal attack on the MB encampment in Rabi’ah al-‘Adawiyyah Square in August of that year) that the power of the Brotherhood was broken in Egypt. Their influence, however, has spread regionally and globally in the decades since its inception. Today, a direct offshoot of the Brotherhood holds power in the western part of Libya (as a dominant element of the GNA government in Tripoli), while Hamas, another self-defined MB affiliate, retains a foothold of governance in Gaza, even if their military capacity has been largely eliminated in the battles since October 2023. The situation in Syria is more complex: the MB elements that played a prominent role in the early stages of the rebellion have long ago been sidelined by more radical elements associated with al-Qaeda and by ISIL, but they are still part of the winning coalition of forces, and they are still backed by the AKP government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as by the Qatari ruling family – acting jointly, for years, as patrons of the MB and movements associated with it across the region.

Notably and significantly, MB affiliates are also prominent among the representative organizations of Muslim communities in the West – including the United States, as already indicated. The teachings of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian MB-associated Islamist who took refuge in Qatar (where he died in 2022, aged 96), include a body of religious law for the practice of Islam in communities that are in a minority (for the time being?) in the West — Fiqh al-Aqaliyyat — and have been quite influential among Muslims in Europe and America.

The Need for a Firm Western Position

In the early years of the so-called “Arab Spring” – actually, an often disastrous political upheaval that shattered regional stability and led to extensive violence in several countries – many in the West (not including Israel’s Hellenic neighbors, Greece and Cyprus, which had reasons to suspect any force supported by Turkey…) tended to take a benign view of the Brotherhood. The Obama Administration apparently saw in them a useful antidote to more extremist elements such as Da’esh (ISIL) and sought to build bridges with President Muhammad Mursi’s government in Egypt, as well as with Erdogan. So did some key European players, who reacted with dismay when Mursi was overthrown in July 2013. Moreover, the above-mentioned role of the MB or activists associated with it or with its ideas in Muslim community organizations in the US and Europe did not prevent such groups from gaining governmental recognition as legitimate interlocutors.

All this needs to change if pro-Western countries in the region (such as Egypt and Jordan, above all) are to be reassured about their long-term prospects in a volatile strategic environment. The confluence of events in the region — specifically, the concern about the ideological orientation of the new rulers in Damascus, the violent action of Islamists on campuses and in the streets, and political changes in the West — creates a window of opportunity to shift away from accommodation of the MB and what it stands for. Thus, the legislation currently being advanced by US Senator Ted Cruz can be a key component of a reorientation in America and Europe that no longer buys the fiction that the MB is a legitimate, “moderate,” and “pragmatic” force.

In effect, the case for the legislation should be framed in terms of support for those in the region, and among Muslims in the diaspora, who espouse a truly liberal (or at least a non-totalitarian) interpretation of Islam. The positions and activities of MB-affiliated groups and organizations should be investigated; legislative barriers erected to the legitimization of such groups and their recognition as representatives of their communities; in relevant cases – as has already been done in Germany and a few other European countries – legal actions, up to and including deportation, should be taken against those who foment hate; and alternative views of Islam should be encouraged, in close coordination with tolerant regional regimes such as the UAE.

The Message to Turkey and Qatar

Alongside the direct benefits of such policies, they can also serve as a warning sign to Erdogan’s Turkey and to Qatar. Israel faces a complex challenge, and so do others in the region who worry about the rise of Turkish- and Qatari-backed forces. Turkey will not go away as a major regional player, nor can its influence be broken in a manner similar to what was done against Iran. It has the second-largest military force in NATO, the largest economy in the region, and holds a key strategic position: it will remain a power to reckon with for the foreseeable future. As for Qatar, which has positioned itself as the indispensable go-between dealing with the crucial question of the hostages in Gaza, it has been able to buy for itself (quite literally) a strategic stance, hosting the largest US Air Force base in the region, as well as cultural and intellectual influence — “soft power” — on university campuses in America and elsewhere. There is a limit to the ability of Israel to confront them directly.

Still, indirect ways to influence their choices should be found. There needs to be a curb on their ability to use the present contingency to shape the region as they see fit. Turkish military action against the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria would send a dangerous message. So would the continuation of Qatari subversion across the region, best exemplified by the content of Al-Jazeera broadcasts in Arabic (not the English language milquetoast version). Both should be put on notice that future cooperation with the West, and specifically with the unpredictable Trump Administration, would be conditional upon the modification of their policies and their ideological impact.

In this respect, an unambiguous stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots – including a coordinated effort by Israel, a U.S.-led multinational group, and relevant regional players to replace Hamas rule in Gaza with a viable transitional administration – would help allay the present fears in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf while sending a message to Turkey and Qatar: to retain the support and tolerance of the U.S. and the West (upon which their economies, and hence their political stability, ultimately depend), they need to modify their conduct, reassess their ideological associations, and limit their regional ambitions.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.