An unusual and strategically significant geopolitical dynamic has emerged in the Middle East in recent months—particularly since the beginning of 2026. At its core is cooperation between leading Sunni actors—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other states—and the Shiite regime in Iran. The primary objective of these contacts is to prevent a U.S. (and potentially Israeli) military strike on Iran and thereby forestall the emergence of a “new Iran” that, in their view, could become aligned with Israel. This cooperation has taken the form of intensive diplomatic efforts, including meetings in Oman and Turkey, as well as pressure on the United States to refrain from military action and work toward a negotiated agreement.
This phenomenon—in which Sunni and Shiite rivals temporarily align—does not stem from a sudden ideological shift or sympathy for the clerical regime. Rather, it reflects deep concern over the consequences of another successful U.S.–Israeli military action against Iran—one that would dramatically strengthen Israel’s position as a dominant regional power, increase the likelihood of a “new Iran,” and thereby undermine the standing of the Gulf states and Turkey.
This article analyzes the convergence between two traditionally opposing currents, tracing the roots of the Sunni–Shiite divide, the formation of geopolitical axes in the 20th and 21st centuries, their evolving interaction, their respective and joint actions toward Israel, and the shift in regional dynamics during the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron). It is also important to note that divisions persist within the Sunni camp itself. Tensions remain, for example, between the Saudi- and Egyptian-led bloc and the Islamist camp led by Turkey (and Qatar), as well as between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Yet even these rivalries are being set aside in the present context of Israel and Iran. The article concludes with policy recommendations for Israel, linked to the emerging national security doctrine of “Peace through Strength.”
The Roots of the Sunni–Shiite Divide
The split between Sunnis and Shiites is widely regarded as one of the deepest and most enduring disputes in the history of the monotheistic religions. Its origin lies in a political and leadership dispute following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. Muhammad’s failure to leave clear instructions regarding his successor created a leadership vacuum that triggered a crisis. That crisis quickly evolved into a sectarian-political division and, over time, into a theological-religious schism.
The dispute between the first four caliphs and the faction of Ali, which argued that leadership must remain within the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt), turned violent when the Battle of Karbala (680 CE) shaped the identity of Ali’s followers (Shi‘at Ali) as that of a persecuted and humiliated minority awaiting divine justice. For centuries, the divide remained primarily political-religious in nature. Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, it evolved into a pronounced geopolitical struggle. The Sunni Ottoman Empire viewed itself as the heir to the Sunni caliphate and used Sunni Islam as a tool of political unity. In contrast, the Safavid dynasty in Iran (1501–1736) made Shiism the official state religion—a strategic move designed to distinguish Persia from the Sunni Ottomans and the Uzbeks. The Ottoman–Safavid conflict lasted for centuries, including bloody wars over Iraq, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan. It largely shaped the modern border between Turkey and Iran and influenced the sectarian distribution of populations, including significant Shiite communities in Iraq and the Gulf.
In the 20th century, the divide acquired a more pronounced geopolitical character. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 created a vacuum in the Sunni world, while the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979 transformed Shiism into a revolutionary transnational force that called for the “export of the revolution” and struggle against the “Great Satan” (the United States) and the “Little Satan” (Israel). Since then, Iran has emerged as a regional Shiite power center, while Saudi Arabia has viewed Shiism as an existential threat. The conflicts in Syria (2011–2024), Yemen, Iraq, and the Gulf turned the Sunni-Shiite divide into a central geopolitical instrument: Iran has built a predominantly Shiite “Axis of Resistance,” while Sunni states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt—have sought to contain Iranian influence.
Today, the divide is not merely religious or theological; it is primarily a struggle over regional hegemony, strategic resources (oil, gas, and maritime routes), political influence, and national identity. Regional states use the divide to justify alliances, proxy wars, and internal repression. Yet, as recent weeks have demonstrated, geopolitical interests can at times override sectarian differences—at least temporarily—as reflected in the current joint opposition to a U.S.–Israeli strike on Iran.
The Formation of the Shiite Axis — Iran as a Regional Power Center
The Shiite axis, also known as the “Axis of Resistance,” developed as a strategic network of military forces, political actors, and proxy organizations under Iran’s leadership. Since the revolution, it has served as one of the central instruments of Iranian foreign policy. Its primary objectives have been to expand Iranian influence in the Middle East, resist U.S. hegemony, act against Israel, and protect Shiite-ideological interests. The axis is not a formal alliance with a defined hierarchical structure. Rather, it is a loose network of partnerships in which Iran provides funding, weapons, training, intelligence, and strategic guidance, while its partners operate under Iranian direction but also according to their own distinct interests.
From Iran’s perspective, the axis was—and remains—grounded in the principle of “exporting the revolution.” This includes support for Islamic-revolutionary groups across the Muslim world, particularly among Shiite communities and other persecuted minorities. The revolution posed an existential threat to neighboring Sunni states, such as Sunni-ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Saudi Arabia, and contributed to the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). It was during that war that Iran first developed a model of supporting proxy militias as a means of confronting its adversaries.
The cornerstone of the axis was the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982. Following the First Lebanon War, Iran deployed forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to organize Shiite militias in southern Lebanon. By 1985, these groups had consolidated under the banner of Hezbollah. Hezbollah became Iran’s most successful proxy. It provided Iran with “strategic depth,” posed a threat to Israel from the north, and served as a model for other proxies. Hezbollah received hundreds of millions of dollars annually in funding, advanced weapons—including precision rockets and anti-tank missiles—training by the IRGC Quds Force, and strategic guidance. In return, Hezbollah functioned as Iran’s military-political arm in Lebanon, participated in the war in Syria, became the dominant force in the country, and continues to challenge the Lebanese government.
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein opened the door to expanded Iranian activity in Iraq. The fall of the Sunni Ba’ath regime created a vacuum through which the Shiites—the demographic majority in Iraq—rose to power, while also enabling the emergence of radical Shiite militias. Iran exploited this environment to build a network of militias, including the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, among others. These militias received training, weapons—including rockets and drones—and funding from Iran. They became a significant force both in the campaign against ISIS (2014–2017) and in internal power struggles within Iraq. They also served as instruments for applying pressure on U.S. forces by attacking American bases and against Israel by launching rockets from Syria and Iraq during the War of Redemption.
The Syrian civil war marked the apex of the axis’s expansion. The Alawite Assad regime had been a strategic ally of Iran since the 1980s and served as a land bridge between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran deployed thousands of IRGC fighters, Iraqi militias, and Hezbollah operatives to defend the Assad regime. This support included funding, weapons, military advisory assistance, and the establishment of Iranian bases in Syria. By 2015–2016, with the help of Russian intervention, the axis had prevented Assad’s collapse and turned Syria into a logistical hub for its operations. Assad’s fall in December 2024, after Hezbollah was significantly weakened by Israel and Iran’s extensive investments in Syria were destroyed, dealt the axis a severe blow. It severed Tehran’s “land bridge” and reduced Iran’s ability to transfer weapons to Hezbollah via the overland route. It also disrupted the smuggling corridor for weapons from Iran to Jordan and onward to Judea and Samaria.
In Yemen, Iran began supporting the Houthis in the 2000s, but this support intensified significantly after 2014, when the Houthis seized Sana’a. Iran supplied advanced weapons—including ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles—along with training and strategic guidance. It transformed the Houthis into a tool for applying pressure on Saudi Arabia and on maritime routes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea. The Houthis thus became the axis’s “southern front,” expanding the geographic scope of Iran’s threat posture.
A notable exception within the Shiite axis was the inclusion of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Sunni movements that joined the axis on the basis of their shared struggle against Israel and the objective of constructing a “ring of fire” surrounding it. Iran became the principal patron of the Palestinian groups, providing annual funding estimated at $70–100 million, along with weapons—including precision rockets and drones—training, and strategic guidance.
The Shiite axis was built primarily on Iran’s use of proxies, allowing the regime to avoid direct risk while creating strategic depth. Up until 2023–2024, the axis was widely regarded as one of Iran’s most effective strategic instruments. However, the War of Redemption significantly weakened Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. This occurred in parallel with the severe damage inflicted on Hezbollah, which contributed to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The culmination came with Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and the heavy blow sustained by Iran, the head of the axis, in Israeli strikes, which were followed by the final American strike. These blows exposed the vulnerabilities of Iran’s “ring of fire”: dependence of the proxies on Tehran, internal fragmentation, and susceptibility to Israeli air and intelligence superiority. As of this writing (February 2026), the axis is undergoing partial recovery—primarily among the Houthis and Iraqi militias—but it has lost a substantial portion of its deterrent power. The clerical regime itself is under threat to its survival due to internal unrest and the American threat.
The Sunni States — A Multiplicity of Centers of Power
The Sunni states of the Middle East have never coalesced into a unified and institutionalized structure comparable to the Shiite axis led by Iran. Unlike this axis—characterized by a relatively clear hierarchy, with Iran as the central power, the IRGC as its operational arm, and a network of proxies—the Sunni camp is marked by multiple centers of power, internal competition for leadership and hegemony, and a more pragmatic posture toward Israel. Key states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt each view themselves as the legitimate leader of the Sunni world, creating a dynamic of tactical cooperation alongside strategic rivalry.
Turkey, under President Erdoğan, views itself as the legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire and as a central actor in advancing the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Since 2011, Erdoğan has sought to expand Turkish influence through support for the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere), backing Sunni rebel groups in Syria, and maintaining close ties with Qatar. Relations with Israel have remained strained. Despite maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Israel, Turkey has provided sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist organizations, promoted economic boycotts of Israel, and employed sharp anti-Israeli rhetoric in an effort to position itself as the “true voice of the Muslim world” ahead of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), sees itself as the guardian of the holy sites (Mecca and Medina) and the leader of the Gulf states. The Saudis have invested heavily in countering Iranian influence (including the war in Yemen and support for Sunni rebels in Syria) and have adopted a pragmatic approach toward Israel. Since 2017–2018, there have been indications of discreet security ties with Israel against Iran, and Riyadh viewed the Abraham Accords (2020) as a strategic opportunity. At the same time, full normalization was conditioned on progress toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the War of Redemption effectively froze the process. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has deepened cooperation with Turkey and moved closer to Qatar, even as tensions with the United Arab Emirates have intensified in several arenas, particularly Yemen.
Egypt, under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, seeks to restore its status as a leader of the Arab world and views the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Turkey and Qatar, as a serious threat. In recent months, however, a measure of Egyptian-Turkish-Saudi rapprochement has taken shape, driven primarily by shared concern over expanding Israeli influence and the prospect of continued pressure on the clerical regime in Iran—potentially even leading to its collapse and the emergence of a “new Iran” that would be friendly to Israel.
The rapprochement between several Sunni states and Israel gained significant momentum through the Abraham Accords (2020). The agreements were rooted in shared interests: countering Iran, advancing economic and technological cooperation, and safeguarding regional stability. Recently, however, the dynamic has shifted. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have moved closer to one another, partly in response to the strengthening of the U.S.–Israel axis under President Trump and the American–Israeli threat toward Iran. These states are working to prevent a U.S.–Israeli strike on Iran, out of concern that the fall of the Iranian regime would further empower Israel as a dominant regional actor and undermine their own standing. They are advancing a “Sunni axis” that includes coordination vis-à-vis Iran, support for the new regime in Syria, and opposition to the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
These Sunni states are therefore characterized by flexibility and pragmatism. They cooperate with Israel against Iran when it serves their interests, yet adopt a sharply confrontational posture toward Israel, and oppose action against Iran, when Israel is perceived as threatening Sunni hegemony. The multiplicity of competing centers—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—prevents full alignment of interests. As of early 2026, the emerging axis represents a temporary alignment against what is framed as the “American–Israeli threat,” but it remains far from being as cohesive as the Shiite axis.
Hegemonic Struggles and the Shift Following the War of Redemption
The struggle between the Shiite axis led by Iran and the Sunni states—or more precisely, between Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and those of leading Sunni powers—is not merely religious. At its core, it is a contest over regional control, strategic resources, trade routes, political influence, and national-regional identity. The Syrian civil war served as the central arena of this contest; Iran viewed the Assad regime as a first line of defense against Israel and as a conduit to Hezbollah, and it invested extensive resources in its preservation by deploying thousands of IRGC fighters and Shiite militias from several countries, with particular emphasis on Hezbollah. Between 2011 and 2020, Iran invested an estimated $30–50 billion in Syria. Turkey, by contrast, directly supported Sunni rebel forces, seized territory in northern Syria, and regards Syria as part of its neo-Ottoman sphere of influence.
The War of Redemption marked a turning point, given the severe damage inflicted on Iran’s entire proxy network—and subsequently on Iran itself. This shift generated anxiety among leading Sunni states. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar concluded that continued Israeli-American successes—particularly another strike on Iran that could topple the clerical regime or significantly weaken it—would cement Israel’s position as the dominant regional power, expand the Abraham Accords, and diminish their own standing. Accordingly, they began to coordinate policy, including refraining from condemning the violent suppression of protests in Iran, exerting diplomatic pressure on President Trump to refrain from striking Iran, and even pursuing temporary rapprochement with Tehran.
At the same time, Israel strengthened its cooperation with the United States. This has included the agreement in Gaza, the expansion of the Abraham Accords to Kazakhstan and Somaliland, and the advancement of the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC). The shift is historic: the Shiite axis has been significantly weakened, the Sunni camp is now confronting a new “Israeli challenge,” and the contest for hegemony has moved from proxy warfare to a diplomatic-strategic contest over the future of Iran and the broader Middle East.
Policy Recommendations for Israel — “Peace through Strength”
The strategic processes that have unfolded in the Middle East since October 2023, particularly since Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, have completely reshaped the regional landscape. The Shiite axis, which until recently constituted the most organized and serious threat to Israel’s security, is now in a state of severe structural weakness. Hezbollah has lost a significant portion of its offensive capabilities, and its position in Lebanon has been undermined. Shiite militias in Iraq have been weakened by Israeli and American strikes. The Houthis in Yemen remain relatively active but are more isolated. The land bridge from Iran to Lebanon via Syria has been almost entirely severed. Iran’s nuclear program has sustained a serious blow, and the regime’s ballistic capabilities have been degraded, despite efforts to restore parts of its capabilities.
At the same time, the leading Sunni states—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt—have found themselves in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, they benefit from the weakening of Iran, which for decades constituted their primary threat. On the other hand, they now perceive a new challenge: Israel’s emergence as a dominant regional power, enjoying unprecedented American backing under President Donald Trump’s second term and capable of shaping the regional agenda. Moreover, the prospect of a “new Iran” aligned with Israel is viewed by these states as a particularly grave threat. The Sunni response to this emerging challenge has been coordinated engagement with Iran aimed at preventing another American–Israeli strike. This cooperation seeks to avert a scenario in which the fall—or significant weakening—of the clerical regime would expand the Abraham Accords, strengthen Israel’s standing, and erode the influence of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
The Middle East now stands at a historic inflection point: it will either continue moving toward a “new Middle East,” in which Israel, working in partnership with the United States, serves as a central pillar of regional economic, security, and political stability within a newly constructed regional architecture; or it will revert to a trajectory in which Iran resumes its efforts to rebuild a “ring of fire” around Israel. The decisive variable will be the American decision regarding Iran: whether Washington opts to launch another series of strikes potentially culminating in the fall of the regime, or whether Sunni diplomatic pressure—led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey—will succeed in delaying or preventing such action. In this context, Israel’s national security doctrine of “Peace through Strength,” which took shape during the War of Redemption appears to provide the most appropriate strategic framework.
This doctrine rests on three pillars:
First, decisive military and intelligence superiority as a prerequisite for enforcement actions designed to neutralize threats before they materialize. Israel must preserve military superiority vis-à-vis all regional actors. This includes the continued systematic degradation of the recovery capabilities of the Shiite axis and other hostile elements—particularly precision missiles, drones, and weapons production facilities in Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Israel’s military strength must be converted into diplomatic leverage aimed at constructing a new regional architecture to replace the Iranian architecture built over the past four decades. Expansion of the Abraham Accords and advancement of regional initiatives such as IMEC constitute the core of this new regional architecture. Israel should continue leveraging its military, economic, and technological strength to broaden the circle of agreements—for example, by offering Saudi Arabia deeper economic and technological cooperation, strengthening alliances with the United Arab Emirates and Morocco, preserving the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and developing new partnerships, including those recently concluded with Greece and Cyprus and the recent establishment of full diplomatic ties with Somaliland. The objective is to generate increasing strategic pressure on Turkey and Qatar.
Second, Israel must act in close coordination with the United States, including joint planning for strike scenarios against Iran should negotiations ultimately fail. It would also be advisable for Israel to expose to the international community the problematic nature of the emerging SunniShiite alignment and the strategic absurd inherent in facilitating Iran’s renewed pursuit of regional hegemony.
Finally, Israel should reinforce the strategic narrative that it is a stable regional power that generates mutual benefit for partners and acts against extremist and destabilizing actors such as Iran and its affiliates. This requires sustaining an initiative-driven and forward-leaning policy against the recovery capabilities of the Shiite axis, alongside expanded economic, technological, and intelligence cooperation with Arab states and other regional actors.
The coming weeks—and in particular the joint American–Israeli decision regarding Iran—will shape the Middle East for generations. “Peace through Strength” is not a slogan but a structured strategy: strength generates deterrence, which enables dialogue; and when dialogue is conducted from a position of power, it can produce stable, interest-based peace. Israel is presently in its strongest position in decades. It must use that position wisely, decisively, and in full coordination with its principal ally to transform the emerging threat into a historic opportunity to reshape the regional order.
Conclusion
The emerging alignment—defined by joint Sunni and Shiite opposition to a strike on Iran aimed at preventing Israel’s further empowerment and the emergence of an Iranian regime friendly to Israel—does not reflect ideological transformation or sudden sympathy for the Shiite regime. Rather, it reflects deep concern over the consequences of another successful military campaign against Iran in which Israel would be a partner. In our assessment, however, this is a short-term perspective whose long-term costs to the Sunni states will exceed its benefits. The War of Redemption has positioned Israel as a central actor shaping the regional agenda. The new Sunni alignment represents a temporary response to what those states perceive as a threat: a scenario in which Israel, as Washington’s preferred partner, leads a “new Middle East” characterized by the expansion of the Abraham Accords, the establishment of a land corridor linking India and Europe, and ultimately Israel’s emergence as a leading security-economic power in the region.
The doctrine of “Peace through Strength” provides Israel with a strategic compass. Israel must preserve military and intelligence superiority, reinforce its alliance with the United States, expand the circle of peace, and expose the emerging alignment. The forthcoming decision regarding how to address Iran will determine the trajectory of the region for generations.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
