On the eve of elections, Israel is not easily amenable to  sober advice on the proper order of its strategic priorities, given the unresolved conflicts it faces on several fronts. Still, as it navigates the controversial issues crowding its agenda in Washington, it must stay focused on the one challenge that affects all the others: sustaining a coordinated policy aimed at bringing about the collapse of the Iranian regime or, alternatively, forcing it to accept terms agreeable to both Israel and the United States on its military nuclear project, ballistic missile arsenal, and proxy system. All other issues must be managed with this priority in mind. Israel need not accept U.S. directives at every turn, but it should avoid friction wherever possible with an administration that includes both committed friends and others whose positions run counter to Israeli interests. Moreover, when Israel and the executive branch disagree, mobilizing support in Congress is no longer as easy as it once was. Thus:

1. Trump’s enthusiastic welcome for the new “Mecca Pact”—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, with Qatar on the wing—need not be challenged directly. Israel should, however, work discreetly with India and the UAE to keep Egypt from sliding into Erdogan’s sway.
   
   
2. In Syria, where forceful Israeli action has caused friction with the U.S. envoy, Israel should maintain a firm stance on Turkey’s presence and the fate of the Druze while keeping channels of communication open and making practical economic gestures of goodwill.
   
   
3. In Lebanon, Israel can and should carefully manage its continuing operational pressure on Hezbollah alongside the U.S.-sponsored talks with the government and step-by-step modular implementation.
   
   
4. Vis-à-vis Gaza, Israel has already “swallowed” a meeting between U.S. officials and Hamas. There can be no compromise on the demand for disarmament, nor is one necessary, but close cooperation with the Board of Peace on humanitarian aid and future planning is already in place.
   
   
5. In Judea and Samaria, Jewish vigilantes have crossed a dangerous red line by violating basic American tenets such as respect for private property. Firm action against them may help ease tensions.

Israel must therefore emphasize its common interests with the U.S., the continuing validity of the Abraham Accords model, and the primacy of the Iranian challenge.

Israel’s Top Priority: The Iranian Challenge

After kinetic action in the spring of 2026 against Iran—and against what should properly be called the IRGC regime in Tehran—the summer was one of simmering discontent and indecision, followed now by an autumn of economic measures on multiple fronts. These include the effective blockade of Iran’s ports and “Operation Outcast,” aimed at restricting its access to the global financial system. Even if Israel still harbors doubts as to the prospects of success, its role at this stage should be to support a firm and, finally, consistent American policy aimed at breaking the regime or bringing it to its knees.

Given current circumstances, the priority is to reaffirm Israel’s commitment to close coordination with the U.S., and specifically CENTCOM, including intelligence cooperation and support in implementing present policies. The immediate challenge is to deter Iran from lashing out as the regime’s economic condition continues to deteriorate. This already entails some direct Israeli involvement in defending the Gulf, (in the UAE) and a measure of assistance to Jordan in the face of persistent attacks against it. The IDF has acknowledged—by launching a nation-wide exercise testing readiness for a multi-front assault—that there is a real possibility that Israel itself could become a target. Tehran has largely avoided targeting Israel in recent months, perhaps because it recognizes Israel’s ability to inflict serious damage on if provoked again. Unless Iran does target Israel, however, Israel’s active role should be subject to the imperatives of current American policy.

The one crucial exception to this deference to U.S. policy must be a clear, unambiguous message as to what should happen, with or without direct American involvement, if intelligence indicates that Iran is trying to resume work on its nuclear project, whether at Pickaxe Mountain or elsewhere. Preparing for that possibility must be Israel’s top intelligence and operational priority.

Ultimately, the collapse of the murderous regime in Tehran must remain a shared goal for Jerusalem and Washington. Yet, that outcome cannot be guaranteed within any specific time frame. At this stage, the most that can be said is that the current course seems to offer a better prospect of success than the previous, incoherent effort to resolve the crisis at the negotiating table. Israel’s role is to help keep that prospect open. For now, and bearing in mind past shifts in Washington’s policy, the Trump administration appears deeply and consistently committed to preventing Iran from resuming its nuclear program. Israel can help by contributing intelligence and technical expertise, keeping its own options ready, and working to ensure that Iran’s missile capabilities and proxy system are also addressed.

Facing the “Mecca Pact” and Erdoğan’s Role

On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. President Donald Trump responded nine days later with a burst of belated enthusiasm, calling the agreement a  “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.” Israel did not necessarily see it that way; ironically, Iran welcomed it too, for its own reasons. Trump clearly expressed the broad notion that the United States should reduce its role and let the countries of the region defend themselves. His response also reflects his opening to Pakistan’s leadership, which he had previously entrusted with an effort to bring Iran to the negotiating table; the long-standing close American association with Saudi Arabia; Qatar’s active role; and, perhaps first and foremost, his warm attitude towards Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whom he considers an effective leader and strategic partner. That warmth is reinforced by U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, Tom Barrack, who also serves as an envoy to Syria and has been a close friend of Trump’s over the years. Barrack has a sympathetic ear for Erdoğan’s positions on key regional issues: notably, he went to considerable lengths to explain that the designation of a Turkish bank for dealings with Iran does not cast a shadow over U.S.-Turkish relations.

From an Israeli perspective,  Washington’s support for an initiative that enhances Erdoğan’s regional reach and feeds his hegemonic ambitions is deeply troubling. Given the Iranian imperative, however, this is not the time to confront the president or his envoy, who has himself faced criticism in Washington for going too far. Significant players, including the Greek American community, are likely to do some of the political work of curbing the administration’s supportive instincts. For Israel’s friends, at this time, this may be a double-edged sword.

Israel should instead focus, without confrontation, on the most urgent task: working carefully with other interested parties, including the UAE and India, to ensure that Egypt (which despite its warming relations with Turkey, did not attend the signing ceremony in Mecca) does not drift too far from its historic commitment to cooperation with the U.S., which has been bound up with its peace treaty with Israel.

Significantly, during his recent visit to Egypt, Xi Jinping advised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to increase Egypt’s “independence of action”—implicitly, to distance it from the U.S. and draw closer to the Mecca Pact, in which Pakistan, a key Chinese client, plays a major role. Still, Israel should communicate firmly but discreetly to Egypt’s leadership, both directly and indirectly, the risks Egypt could face if drawn into Erdoğan’s orbit, given his unwavering support for the Muslim Brotherhood and what it stands for.

The Syrian Theater

A similar challenge awaits Israel in the Syrian theater. The term “theater” may well be appropriate in this context: many of the players in the post-Assad era seem to wear different masks at different times. Israeli policy reflects this sense of apprehension as to the authenticity of their purported transformation from a distinctly jihadi identity to a civic-minded, pro-Western agenda. In a sense, the situation in the Druze-controlled areas in the Suweyda area serves as a litmus test:  given Israel’s firm commitment to the Druze—based on its own domestic as well as strategic imperatives—the manner in which the regime in Damascus handles this ongoing challenge may indicate its broader intentions and orientation. Notably, there are signs that the regime is willing to engage with the overtly pro-Israeli leadership in Suweyda, which helps explain Israel’s willingness to return to the table for high-level talks facilitated by Jordan. Much still needs to happen, to however, for attitudes to change.

At the same time, Israel needs to bear in mind that the American position has shifted much faster. Having now removed all sanctions on Damascus, Washington now regards Syria under Ahmed al-Shara’s regime as a legitimate player and business partner. To a significant extent, this reflects the positions of the American envoy, Tom Barrack, who was instrumental in bringing about the arrangements under which the largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces have been disbanded and are to be integrated into the Syrian military. All this was followed by Barrack’s blunt criticism of the August 18 Israeli air strike that disabled the Abu al-Dhuhur airbase.

Given the American statements and acts of support for the central authority in Damascus, policy choices in Israel should carefully balance two imperatives. One is the obvious need to ensure key national security objectives: its red lines concerning Turkish deployments in Syria; the IAF’s freedom to operate over Syrian airspace, which is vital to any future campaign against Iran; defense of the border areas against terrorist infiltration; and the Druze community’s continued ability to maintain its present degree of autonomy in Suweyda. The other, given Washington’s position, is to keep channels of communication with the Syrian government open—through third parties if necessary—and show Washington that Israel is acting in good faith on the basis of genuine security concerns.

Lebanon: The Prospects for Progress and the American Role

The dynamics in Lebanon differ from those in Syria in one crucial respect. Israel sees the current government in Beirut led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam as genuinely interested in moving forward, not out of a fervent desire for peace with Israel but because they are eager to be rid of what has effectively become an Iranian occupation. As long as Hezbollah retains its weapons, it can draw Lebanon back into a bloody and destructive war if Tehran orders it to do so.

Hence Lebanon’s willingness, for the first time since 1983, to talk directly and openly with Israel’s government, through the two countries’ ambassadors in Washington, and to sign a U.S.-sponsored framework agreement. From Israel’s perspective, the problem is one of capability, not intent. Israel and the U.S. share grave doubts about Lebanon’s ability to deliver on disarming Hezbollah, and current signs that the organization is resuming violent activities point to further difficulties down the road.

Israel must therefore again balance its national security concerns against the need to maintain its commitment to the framework (promoted by the Trump Administration as one more historic breakthrough for peace around the world…). The key organizing concept, in this respect, is modularity—i.e., testing implementation step by step, over time, on the basis of a tacit understanding with the administration as to what would constitute sufficient conditions for Israel to withdraw from the next area, if and when a  “pilot” succeeds.

Modularity in Gaza

Ultimately, the same approach is valid for the future of the Gaza Strip. Recently,  there has been some tension between the American and Israeli perspectives, and Israel was obliged to “swallow” key American negotiator Jared Kushner openly meeting in Egypt with Hamas leaders. There are major gaps between the contending interpretations of Hamas’s supposed willingness to disarm, as well as over the pace and scope of an ISF deployment and the subsequent expectation of IDF withdrawals, initially from areas which are beyond the Yellow Line.

Given the prestige Trump has invested in the “Board of Peace” (BoP) and the multi-layered structure suggested as an alternative to Hamas rule, Israel should propose a modular test of the American concept—which has its roots in ideas Israel itself raised in the past —rather than confront Washington on this issue. Such a test could entail very limited withdrawals and handing governance to local leaders —namely,  clans that have already shown both a willingness and an ability to resist Hamas rule. (The proposed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza is far too weak to be effective, as is the Palestinian Authority, which lacks any effective means to govern Gaza.)

The U.S.-Israel dialog on this issue, as defined during Kushner’s visit, breaks this down into two categories of discussion. The  first covers humanitarian issues, largely managed through the Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC)—an unprecedented arrangement involving American, Israeli, multi-national, and even Arab officers working together on Israeli soil. The second concerns the more precarious progress toward security solutions and new realities on the ground. The key, at this delicate stage, is once again to demonstrate to Washington that while there are genuine security concerns at stake (and that the validity of these concerns is anchored in the text of UNSCR 2803), the ultimate aims of U.S., Israeli and BoP policies are the same (hence the need to discount political statements about renewed settlement or forced transfer).

Judea and Samaria: The Test of Governance   

Unlike some previous administrations, the Trump administration has not endorsed the position, now vigorously promoted by several key European actors, that the entire settlement project in Judea and Samaria is illegal, illegitimate, and an obstacle to peace. During Trump’s first term, and again now, U.S. officials have visited Jewish towns in Samaria and expressed their sympathies. Thus, the administration’s recent blunt criticism, particularly Ambassador Huckabee’s remarks during his visit to Turmus’ayyeh, should be read as a sign of extreme displeasure at what looks like a possibly deliberate loss of Israeli governance in those areas.

American traditions—not only on the left—assign great importance to the concept of private property (this is how scholars interpret the term “the pursuit of happiness” in Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence…). Hence the acute dismay displayed over acts by Israeli individuals which openly infringe on the private property of Palestinian families. This dismay is all the acute when some of them happen to be dual U.S. citizens.

Here too, the management of U.S.-Israeli relations at this critical stage requires a clear statement of Israel’s determination to restore governance and ensure that Israel’s role in Judea and Samaria is not defined by lawless behavior—Prime Minister Netanyahu has gone some of the way to doing this.