The very fact that countries once identified with the region’s “camp of stability,” united by their opposition to totalitarian Islamism in its various forms, met in Abu Dhabi (September 27, 2026)—along with the United States, and during a visit there by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—is of strategic significance. Until recently, Turkey, a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideas, appeared to be succeeding, alongside Qatar and Pakistan, in breaking up this camp and drawing Saudi Arabia—and, to some extent, Egypt—into its orbit. President Donald Trump, who is reluctant to help Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis, even gave his blessing to the “Mecca Alliance.” Houthi gains in the current round of fighting, particularly their tentative hold on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, have, however, changed the calculus, above all for the Saudis but also for Egypt and other countries. Riyadh discovered that Turkey and Pakistan offered only minimal and largely symbolic help in defending Saudi Arabia against a significant threat. It has also recognized the heavy cost of its rift with the UAE, which divided the forces fighting the Houthis in Yemen. (That rift extended to the personal relationship between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, once bin Salman’s friend and political mentor.) Riyadh may have also realized that Israel can help the Saudis in sensitive areas, as it has helped the UAE since the campaign against Iran began.

It is too soon to call a single meeting a turning point. Still, the identity of the participants—including Saddam Haftar, son of the ruler of eastern Libya—offers an indication that Turkey’s growing regional influence has been checked to some degree. While Iran uses radical proxies and Turkey shows itself willing to deploy Syrians with jihadist backgrounds in Somalia and now Yemen,  others in the region—Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and, above all, their Emirati hosts— share a hostility to Islamism in its various forms. The implications of the Flydubai flight incident could, at least in theory, heighten their sensitivity to this threat. However, Saudi Arabia’s insistence on barring Israeli aircraft from landing in the kingdom, along with its denial that it participated in the meeting, shows that obstacles remain before this potential can be realized openly.

As for the American position, President Trump may be fond of Erdogan, but the U.S. military establishment—specifically U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—remains firmly committed to its historic partnership with the region’s stabilizing actors, including Israel. Prudent Israeli diplomacy now could therefore reopen political opportunities that seemed, until recently, to have hit a dead end.

How Houthi Gains Affect Saudi Policy

The key to understanding the recent changes in the Saudi leadership’s conduct and outlook, after it had appeared that Riyadh was basing its strategic alignment on its partnership with Turkey and Pakistan under the Mecca Alliance, is the substantial battlefield gains made by the Houthis after Saudi Arabia itself chose to resume fighting on the ground. The Houthis captured another substantial stretch of Yemen’s coast and gained effective control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Moreover, they declared that they would bar Saudi ships from passing through the Red Sea. In their contacts with Washington, by contrast, they made clear that they would not attack American—or even Israeli—ships. The United States has sent a clear message that it is unwilling to help the Saudis in their predicament, as the administration continues to focus on keeping all options open regarding Iran. Mohammed bin Salman’s dilemma has thus become even more acute.

Turkey and Pakistan should in theory have been able to back Riyadh after its military weakness was once again exposed (despite the quality and quantity of military equipment it has amassed over the years). In practice, however, as the crisis worsened, Riyadh’s partners—even if they have declared that they were “activating” the treaty—offered little beyond largely symbolic contributions. Turkey’s contribution was, moreover, problematic: it sent to Yemen proxy elements, Syrians with jihadist backgrounds who had hardly distinguished themselves in earlier fighting in Somalia.

The meeting in the UAE thus suggests three conclusions reached by Saudi leaders:

1. The Mecca Alliance has proved to be largely empty of any real content. It offers little beyond declarations, token troop deployments, and Turkey’s willingness to “contribute” elements of Syrian jihadist militias to the fighting in Yemen.
   
   
2. Saudi Arabia has paid too high a price for its rift with the UAE in recent years; most importantly, the two countries’ support for rival forces in Yemen has meant that, instead of uniting against the Houthis, those forces have neutralized one another. Part of the issue has been the personal rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), once considered a friend and even a “mentor” to the younger Saudi.
   
   
3. Israel, despite the kingdom’s firm insistence that normalization depend on progress toward a Palestinian state, has much to offer to Saudi Arabia in view of the threats it faces, as demonstrated by Jerusalem’s assistance to the UAE, including the deployment of missile-defense systems.

The Other Participants and Their Considerations

Egypt’s participation in the meeting in the UAE shows that it maintains close ties with Abu Dhabi (which has invested tens of billions of dollars in Egypt) despite its rapprochement with Turkey in recent years, including some military cooperation. Cairo also continues to cultivate its relationships with Greece and Cyprus and remains mindful of the sensitivities surrounding its peace treaty with Israel. Moreover, the Egyptian regime retains a deep, fundamental hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters.

Saddam Haftar’s presence also matters in strategic terms. He is the son of Khalifa Haftar, the ruler of eastern Libya (Cyrenaica), a client of Egypt. Not long ago, Khalifa Haftar was a bitter enemy of the Turks, who intervened militarily against him in 2019. More recently, they have opened channels of dialogue with him as they seek to draw Egypt into a neo-Ottoman sphere of influence. He should nevertheless still be seen as an opponent of Turkey’s ambition to dominate the eastern Mediterranean, an ambition reflected in Ankara’s ties to the rival government in Tripoli.

Jordan’s participation is of importance to Israel. Recent attacks on American bases in Jordan have underscored the gravity of the Iranian threat—and thus the importance of closer security cooperation between Amman and Jerusalem.

Morocco’s role in the Abu Dhabi meeting is also noteworthy: its security ties with Israel are closer than ever. At the same time, the move to appoint Fatima Zahra al-Mansouri as the kingdom’s first woman prime minister sends a clear message rejecting the agenda of Islamic radicalism and affirming Morocco’s unequivocal place in the camp of stability. Recent events have once again demonstrated that this camp remains relevant.

In the U.S., where President Trump has shown troubling displays of sympathy for the Mecca Alliance, the military establishment—specifically CENTCOM—has deep, established ties with the countries of the camp of stability. Those ties also include Israel, which since 2021 has been within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility and participates in the integrated regional air-defense arrangement. U.S. participation in the meeting reflects its regional ties.

Israel’s Role

The prime minister’s visit to the UAE at this time, in connection with the meeting, thus suggests that a return to deeper regional partnership may be possible – given the Houthi crisis and the possibility of renewed escalation with Iran, as long as its nuclear activity requires constant monitoring and Washington keeps all its options open.

There is a solid basis for cooperation across a spectrum of military, security, and intelligence matters. The displeasure over the assignment of an Omani copilot to a Flydubai flight to Israel is justified, but must not cloud the broader, important relationship with the UAE. Politically, a single meeting does not yet herald sweeping change, particularly when the Arab side has not publicized it officially. It may nevertheless point to a way forward if Israel makes wise use of the opportunity and handles issues sensitive to the Arab world with care and sound judgment. Throughout, the struggle against Iran and the desire to undermine the regime in Tehran remain the overriding concern, with all that this entails over the long term. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia’s insistence on barring Israeli aircraft from landing in the kingdom to evacuate the Flydubai passengers, along with the denial that it participated in the meeting, shows that obstacles remain before this potential can become an overt reality.