The Biden administration, along with both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, has taken firm positions on the key questions posed by the October 7 War, and on the broadening regional conflict led by Iran – at least when it comes to words and ideas. The response to the death of Yahya Sinwar– “the world is a better place” – was notable. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the horrors perpetrated by Hamas a year ago clearly reflected the recognition that they echoed Nazi atrocities. Time and again, and specifically after the murder of six Israeli hostages in August, 2024, the U.S. has reaffirmed that Hamas must not be allowed to rule in Gaza. In the same manner, the reactions to the elimination of Hezbollah leaders underscored the long-standing view of them as wanted terrorists. A military coalition was formed to contend with Houthi attacks on international shipping. Perhaps most significantly, the administration – as well as Harris and Trump in their respective campaigns – made it clear that Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.
This rhetoric however was only partially translated into action. The U.S. offered a generous aid package to Israel and coordinated responses to Iran’s attacks. Recently, Washington carried out a B-2 strike in Yemen as a message to Tehran. Yet, in terms of the broader regional reality, a shadow falls between declared American objectives and the actual impact of U.S. policies. Washingtons has constrained Israel’s options at key moments or left it to fend for itself. For a combination of reasons – moral qualms, concern about being drawn into the conflict, and specific domestic political imperatives – U.S. actions were often half-hearted and irresolute.
The push for a ceasefire, however well-intentioned, does not square with the need to rid Gaza of Hamas rule. The same can be said about the attempt to broker a deal in Lebanon and restrain Israeli strikes. Allied responses to Houthi provocations have been largely confined to limited counter-force measures. Moreover, the administration (though not Trump) seems averse to the prospect of an attack on Iran’s nuclear project – which can hardly be stopped any other way.
Whoever wins the November 2024 presidential elections will need to take far more resolute action, if Iran and its proxies – in turn, a key part of the China, Russia, Iran and North Korea anti-American alignment – are to be denied their bid for regional hegemony.
The Idea: Firm Expressions of Support for Israel’s War
The American response to the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was unequivocal and impressive, with both President Joe Biden and Vice President and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris speaking out strongly: “This is a good day for Israel, for the United States, and for the world,” wrote Biden. “Justice has been served,” echoed Harris. Going back a year to the events of October 7, 2023 the reactions to the Hamas assault were equally blunt and unambiguous from day one, particularly at moments of anger.
President Joe Biden, shocked by the initial images from the massacre, did not hesitate to evoke the memory of the Holocaust –appropriately so, given Hamas’ ideological lineage. A year later, on the anniversary of the attack, Secretary of State Tony Blinken (whose stepfather was a Holocaust survivor) described the slaughter as “the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Girls and women were sexually assaulted. The depravity of Hamas’s crimes is almost unspeakable.”
The conclusion drawn from this position of moral outrage would seem to be equally firm – at least in the realm of ideas. Following the murder of the six hostages in Gaza, Biden published a statement asserting that “Hamas leaders will pay for these crimes.” Harris, speaking as vice president, but in the context of her campaign, issued a statement on August 31, 2024, using the same term Blinken would later employ – Hamas depravity – and made it clear that, in her view, “The threat Hamas poses to Israel – and American citizens in Israel – must be eliminated and Hamas cannot control Gaza.”
Similarly, American public reactions to the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, as Israel struck them one by one, reflected the fact that several of them were wanted as terrorists by the U.S. who had American blood on their hands, and significant bounties on their heads. President Biden’s statement on September 28, 2024, could not have been any more straightforward: “Hassan Nasrallah and the terrorist group he led, Hezbollah, were responsible for killing hundreds of Americans over a four-decade reign of terror. His death from an Israeli airstrike is a measure of justice for his many victims, including thousands of Americans, Israelis, and Lebanese civilians.” (He could have also mentioned the Syrian Sunnis butchered by Hezbollah on Bashar Assad’s behalf). Hence, he added, “The United States fully supports Israel’s right to defend itself against Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and any other Iranian-supported terrorist groups.”
The threat posed by the Houthis to international freedom of navigation was also met with firm language and a formal commitment by the U.S. and its allies. On January 11, 2024, Biden stated “The response of the international community to these reckless attacks has been united and resolute. Last month, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian – a coalition of more than 20 nations committed to defending international shipping and deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. We have also joined more than 40 nations in condemning Houthi threats. Last week, together with 13 allies and partners, we issued an unequivocal warning that Houthi rebels would bear the consequences if their attacks did not cease.”
Iran was treated to similar warnings. “Don’t,” said Biden in October 2023, and repeated this terse phrase on 11 August 2024 when asked “What’s your message to Iran.” The U.S. did deploy a deterrent presence to the region and played a significant role in limiting the effectiveness of Iran’s two missile salvoes against Israel. At certain points, its posture did seem to have an impact on Tehran’s decisions.
Moreover, Vice President Harris made her position clear on the key question of American perceptions of Iran, and the need to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power. In an interview with CBS on October 7, 2024, she described Iran as the “greatest enemy” of the United States and asserted that America needs to “ensure that Iran never achieves the ability to be a nuclear power. This is one of my highest priorities.” Former President Trump (who accuses Iranian agents of trying to assassinate him) went further, actively urging Israel to ignore the administration’s advice and strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Reality: Half Hearted Policies
Brave words. But on all four fronts, the actual implementation of US policies was all too often indecisive, for a combination of reasons:
- Moral qualms and humanitarian concerns, over the nature of warfare which, inevitably, is conducted in densely populated areas – in the current case, from Gaza to the Dahia district of Beirut – as well as the priority given to the hostage issue.
- Strategic considerations, regarding the implications of a broader war on U.S. interests, including energy prices, as well as on vulnerable American clients in the Gulf, and the risk of U.S. forces being drawn in directly.
- Political imperatives, driven by pressures from the Democratic Party’s radical progressive wing and a presidential election campaign in which a few “uncommitted” pro-Palestinian votes in Michigan may determine the balance of the electoral college.
As a result, regarding all four of these above reasons, the real positions taken by the administration – in terms of support for Israel’s strategic purposes and seeking the defeat of common enemies – did not necessarily contribute to the achievement of the ambitious goals enunciated.
The persistent push for a ceasefire in Gaza, though driven in part by the noble aim of rescuing the hostages, reflected a growing political problem for the administration as a result of the war, as well as increasing moral unease on its part as the fighting persisted. The U.S. attempted – and ultimately failed – to prevent Israel from taking Rafah – causing a highly problematic delay – due to humanitarian arguments which proved to be baseless. It has now formally endorsed the goal of a ceasefire. There are indications that Trump, too, wishes to see the fighting in Gaza ended before he potentially takes office, should he be elected. None of this aligns with the assertion that Hamas must not be allowed to rule Gaza- especially as neither the administration nor the Israeli government has yet to produce a coherent and implementable design to replace Hamas with a viable (transitional?) alternative.
In Lebanon, side by side with the depiction of Hezbollah as a terror organization which clearly bears the blame for provoking the conflict, the administration – and specifically, Biden’s envoy Amos Hochstein – spent considerable effort trying to negotiate an agreed outcome that would have left Hezbollah, redeployed north of the Litani River, largely unscathed and with its grip on Lebanese state institutions as firm as ever. Israel chose to pursue a different course that has significantly reduced Iran’s ability to use Lebanon at will. While calls for such an agreement persist in Washington and Paris, recent reports suggest that the U.S. has begun to explore ways to translate the setbacks Israel has inflicted on Hezbollah into a new political balance in Lebanon, starting with the election of a president less reliant on Hezbollah and its political allies. Whether this goal will be energetically pursued or abandoned when challenged remains uncertain, leaving Israel once again with the burden of reshaping realities on the ground.
In the conflict with the Houthi regime in Sana’a, American and allied military actions have been largely limited to strikes on specific sources of fire (missiles and drones) aiming to make the Houthi regime “bear the consequences.” This restraint may reflect an overly legalistic application of the laws of war. Israel, applying a broader but still valid interpretation, chose to exact a higher price in terms of national infrastructure used to support the Houthi war effort, sending, albeit so far with limited effect, a stronger deterrent message. The American strikes ion Sana’a and Saada on October 17, 2024 – which for the first time, employed B-2 bombers –may signal a change in American policy. These strikes were openly presented as evidence of American capabilities, with –Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explaining (with Iran’s leadership his obvious audience) that the U.S. could “take action against these [hardened] targets when necessary, anytime, anywhere.”
However, when it comes to Iran, the Biden Administration appears to have imposed an overt veto on an Israeli strike against Tehran’s nuclear project. Beyond Austin’s general warning, This, ideally, have been paired with a firm commitment to doing what needs to be done before the window of opportunity closes.,. Once again, the resounding U.S. rhetoric on preventing Iran from ever being able to become a nuclear threshold state – has yet to be backed by clear understandings with Israel as to how this goal can be realized, something that must happen soon, given recent Iranian conduct and the mounting pressure in Tehran to go for a breakout towards the bomb.
Out of the Shadows: The Need for a Coordinated U.S.-Israeli War Strategy
Back in 2013, when President Barack Obama opted for a diplomatic solution to the Syrian chemical weapons issue rather than honor his own “red line” and strike the regime, he famously remarked that “credibility is overrated.” This may have been barely true back then, when U.S. power was still largely unchallenged, and its allies relatively secure. However, this is most definitely not the case now, when the China, Russia, Iran, North Korea alignment is actively challenging the U.S. and the West on multiple fronts.
To restore both credibility and deterrence, the administration may well need to change course after the upcoming elections – and in all probability already during the transition period –and commit to an outcome that would constitute a decisive defeat of Iranian-led forces in the region. Such an outcome is bound to have positive effects on other fronts as well. In practical terms, this should entail:
- Coordinating with Israel a coherent path to the elimination of Hamas rule in Gaza and its replacement with a transitional regime that addresses the needs of the population, while also respecting Israel’s security concerns and implementing a policy of de-radicalization.
- Bringing about a profound change in the balance of political power in Lebanon and establishing a security regime that would no longer rely on an ineffectual UN force.
- Increasing the cost of Houthi aggression to a level intolerable for the regime in Sana’a. This should be done in close coordination with Israel and other victims of Houthi hostilities in the region.
- Above all, the U.S. must translate into action its commitment to deny Iran a path to the bomb. Moreover it must leverage the present crisis to weaken the regime of the Ayatollahs, which is detested by many Iranians, and is clearly more vulnerable than it pretended to be when its proxies seemed ascendant in the region. This would have a grand strategic impact not only in Tehran but also on the willingness of other anti-American players to take risks in the face of resolute American action.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Home page / Policy Papers / Between the idea and the reality: The Shadow Falling on US Policy in the Region
Between the idea and the reality: The Shadow Falling on US Policy in the Region
The Biden administration, along with both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, has taken firm positions on the key questions posed by the October 7 War, and on the broadening regional conflict led by Iran – at least when it comes to words and ideas. The response to the death of Yahya Sinwar– “the world is a better place” – was notable. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the horrors perpetrated by Hamas a year ago clearly reflected the recognition that they echoed Nazi atrocities. Time and again, and specifically after the murder of six Israeli hostages in August, 2024, the U.S. has reaffirmed that Hamas must not be allowed to rule in Gaza. In the same manner, the reactions to the elimination of Hezbollah leaders underscored the long-standing view of them as wanted terrorists. A military coalition was formed to contend with Houthi attacks on international shipping. Perhaps most significantly, the administration – as well as Harris and Trump in their respective campaigns – made it clear that Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.
This rhetoric however was only partially translated into action. The U.S. offered a generous aid package to Israel and coordinated responses to Iran’s attacks. Recently, Washington carried out a B-2 strike in Yemen as a message to Tehran. Yet, in terms of the broader regional reality, a shadow falls between declared American objectives and the actual impact of U.S. policies. Washingtons has constrained Israel’s options at key moments or left it to fend for itself. For a combination of reasons – moral qualms, concern about being drawn into the conflict, and specific domestic political imperatives – U.S. actions were often half-hearted and irresolute.
The push for a ceasefire, however well-intentioned, does not square with the need to rid Gaza of Hamas rule. The same can be said about the attempt to broker a deal in Lebanon and restrain Israeli strikes. Allied responses to Houthi provocations have been largely confined to limited counter-force measures. Moreover, the administration (though not Trump) seems averse to the prospect of an attack on Iran’s nuclear project – which can hardly be stopped any other way.
Whoever wins the November 2024 presidential elections will need to take far more resolute action, if Iran and its proxies – in turn, a key part of the China, Russia, Iran and North Korea anti-American alignment – are to be denied their bid for regional hegemony.
The Idea: Firm Expressions of Support for Israel’s War
The American response to the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was unequivocal and impressive, with both President Joe Biden and Vice President and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris speaking out strongly: “This is a good day for Israel, for the United States, and for the world,” wrote Biden. “Justice has been served,” echoed Harris. Going back a year to the events of October 7, 2023 the reactions to the Hamas assault were equally blunt and unambiguous from day one, particularly at moments of anger.
President Joe Biden, shocked by the initial images from the massacre, did not hesitate to evoke the memory of the Holocaust –appropriately so, given Hamas’ ideological lineage. A year later, on the anniversary of the attack, Secretary of State Tony Blinken (whose stepfather was a Holocaust survivor) described the slaughter as “the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Girls and women were sexually assaulted. The depravity of Hamas’s crimes is almost unspeakable.”
The conclusion drawn from this position of moral outrage would seem to be equally firm – at least in the realm of ideas. Following the murder of the six hostages in Gaza, Biden published a statement asserting that “Hamas leaders will pay for these crimes.” Harris, speaking as vice president, but in the context of her campaign, issued a statement on August 31, 2024, using the same term Blinken would later employ – Hamas depravity – and made it clear that, in her view, “The threat Hamas poses to Israel – and American citizens in Israel – must be eliminated and Hamas cannot control Gaza.”
Similarly, American public reactions to the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, as Israel struck them one by one, reflected the fact that several of them were wanted as terrorists by the U.S. who had American blood on their hands, and significant bounties on their heads. President Biden’s statement on September 28, 2024, could not have been any more straightforward: “Hassan Nasrallah and the terrorist group he led, Hezbollah, were responsible for killing hundreds of Americans over a four-decade reign of terror. His death from an Israeli airstrike is a measure of justice for his many victims, including thousands of Americans, Israelis, and Lebanese civilians.” (He could have also mentioned the Syrian Sunnis butchered by Hezbollah on Bashar Assad’s behalf). Hence, he added, “The United States fully supports Israel’s right to defend itself against Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and any other Iranian-supported terrorist groups.”
The threat posed by the Houthis to international freedom of navigation was also met with firm language and a formal commitment by the U.S. and its allies. On January 11, 2024, Biden stated “The response of the international community to these reckless attacks has been united and resolute. Last month, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian – a coalition of more than 20 nations committed to defending international shipping and deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. We have also joined more than 40 nations in condemning Houthi threats. Last week, together with 13 allies and partners, we issued an unequivocal warning that Houthi rebels would bear the consequences if their attacks did not cease.”
Iran was treated to similar warnings. “Don’t,” said Biden in October 2023, and repeated this terse phrase on 11 August 2024 when asked “What’s your message to Iran.” The U.S. did deploy a deterrent presence to the region and played a significant role in limiting the effectiveness of Iran’s two missile salvoes against Israel. At certain points, its posture did seem to have an impact on Tehran’s decisions.
Moreover, Vice President Harris made her position clear on the key question of American perceptions of Iran, and the need to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power. In an interview with CBS on October 7, 2024, she described Iran as the “greatest enemy” of the United States and asserted that America needs to “ensure that Iran never achieves the ability to be a nuclear power. This is one of my highest priorities.” Former President Trump (who accuses Iranian agents of trying to assassinate him) went further, actively urging Israel to ignore the administration’s advice and strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Reality: Half Hearted Policies
Brave words. But on all four fronts, the actual implementation of US policies was all too often indecisive, for a combination of reasons:
As a result, regarding all four of these above reasons, the real positions taken by the administration – in terms of support for Israel’s strategic purposes and seeking the defeat of common enemies – did not necessarily contribute to the achievement of the ambitious goals enunciated.
The persistent push for a ceasefire in Gaza, though driven in part by the noble aim of rescuing the hostages, reflected a growing political problem for the administration as a result of the war, as well as increasing moral unease on its part as the fighting persisted. The U.S. attempted – and ultimately failed – to prevent Israel from taking Rafah – causing a highly problematic delay – due to humanitarian arguments which proved to be baseless. It has now formally endorsed the goal of a ceasefire. There are indications that Trump, too, wishes to see the fighting in Gaza ended before he potentially takes office, should he be elected. None of this aligns with the assertion that Hamas must not be allowed to rule Gaza- especially as neither the administration nor the Israeli government has yet to produce a coherent and implementable design to replace Hamas with a viable (transitional?) alternative.
In Lebanon, side by side with the depiction of Hezbollah as a terror organization which clearly bears the blame for provoking the conflict, the administration – and specifically, Biden’s envoy Amos Hochstein – spent considerable effort trying to negotiate an agreed outcome that would have left Hezbollah, redeployed north of the Litani River, largely unscathed and with its grip on Lebanese state institutions as firm as ever. Israel chose to pursue a different course that has significantly reduced Iran’s ability to use Lebanon at will. While calls for such an agreement persist in Washington and Paris, recent reports suggest that the U.S. has begun to explore ways to translate the setbacks Israel has inflicted on Hezbollah into a new political balance in Lebanon, starting with the election of a president less reliant on Hezbollah and its political allies. Whether this goal will be energetically pursued or abandoned when challenged remains uncertain, leaving Israel once again with the burden of reshaping realities on the ground.
In the conflict with the Houthi regime in Sana’a, American and allied military actions have been largely limited to strikes on specific sources of fire (missiles and drones) aiming to make the Houthi regime “bear the consequences.” This restraint may reflect an overly legalistic application of the laws of war. Israel, applying a broader but still valid interpretation, chose to exact a higher price in terms of national infrastructure used to support the Houthi war effort, sending, albeit so far with limited effect, a stronger deterrent message. The American strikes ion Sana’a and Saada on October 17, 2024 – which for the first time, employed B-2 bombers –may signal a change in American policy. These strikes were openly presented as evidence of American capabilities, with –Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explaining (with Iran’s leadership his obvious audience) that the U.S. could “take action against these [hardened] targets when necessary, anytime, anywhere.”
However, when it comes to Iran, the Biden Administration appears to have imposed an overt veto on an Israeli strike against Tehran’s nuclear project. Beyond Austin’s general warning, This, ideally, have been paired with a firm commitment to doing what needs to be done before the window of opportunity closes.,. Once again, the resounding U.S. rhetoric on preventing Iran from ever being able to become a nuclear threshold state – has yet to be backed by clear understandings with Israel as to how this goal can be realized, something that must happen soon, given recent Iranian conduct and the mounting pressure in Tehran to go for a breakout towards the bomb.
Out of the Shadows: The Need for a Coordinated U.S.-Israeli War Strategy
Back in 2013, when President Barack Obama opted for a diplomatic solution to the Syrian chemical weapons issue rather than honor his own “red line” and strike the regime, he famously remarked that “credibility is overrated.” This may have been barely true back then, when U.S. power was still largely unchallenged, and its allies relatively secure. However, this is most definitely not the case now, when the China, Russia, Iran, North Korea alignment is actively challenging the U.S. and the West on multiple fronts.
To restore both credibility and deterrence, the administration may well need to change course after the upcoming elections – and in all probability already during the transition period –and commit to an outcome that would constitute a decisive defeat of Iranian-led forces in the region. Such an outcome is bound to have positive effects on other fronts as well. In practical terms, this should entail:
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
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Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
Dr. Lerman is deputy director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS). He was deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. He held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence for over 20 years. He also served for eight years as director of the Israel and Middle East office of the American Jewish Committee. He teaches in the Middle East studies program at Shalem College in Jerusalem, and in post-graduate programs at Tel Aviv University and the National Defense College. He is an expert on Israel’s foreign relations, and on the Middle East. A third-generation Sabra, he holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, and a mid-career MPA from Harvard University.
Recent publications
Dr. Alon Levkowitz: Korea’s Defense Posture
Ambassador Shivshankar Menon: The Present Impasse in India-China Relations and Their Future
Prof. Eyal Ben Ari – Japan: A Tipping Point in Foreign & Defense Policies
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