The map of camps in 2024: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose
Events in recent years have changed the political map of the region once again – but the underlying logic of the ideological affiliations, and their impact on regional power dynamics, remains largely valid. Moreover, this “game of camps” colors regional responses to the ongoing war in Gaza and attitudes towards Israel and lends crucial importance to its outcome.
The Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups have been under significant pressure: hunted in Egypt, marginalized by more radical groups in Syria, coopted into politics in Jordan, and challenged in Libya. But the survival of Hamas in Gaza, and the war it launched on 7 October 2023, means that at this time, their standing as contenders for dominance in the region hinges, directly, on the outcome of Israel’s quest to destroy Hamas.
Equally important for the future of this camp – and of the region as a whole – is the revisionist bid by the governing party in Turkey, Erdogan’s AKP (Adalet ve-Kalkinma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), to transform the balance of power as well as the ideological orientation of the region. Turkey is the region’s largest economy, a member of NATO, and an ambitious international player: its meddling in the internal affairs of Libya (where Ankara intervened militarily) and Egypt (where its support for the Muslim Brotherhood was not translated into action) reflects a combination of ideological-religious motivations, neo-Ottoman dreams and shrewd, manipulative power games. In recent years, facing serious economic constraints and a tough re-election campaign, Erdogan seemed to modify his stance towards key members of the “camp of stability” – even towards Israel, at least for a while – and is now aggressively courting the Egyptian regime, which he condemned in 2013 for usurping power from the Muslim Brotherhood: but this is more of a tactical device than a change of grand strategy from revisionism to acceptance of the status quo.
With parts of Syria under its direct occupation, with military operations in Iraq, large-scale intervention in Libya in support of a Muslim Brotherhood-oriented government in Tripoli, and a close alliance with Qatar, Turkey is clearly engaged in an effort to lead the camp of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and restore its historical role as the region’s dominant power. Muslim Brotherhood parties or their affiliates continue to exist elsewhere across the region, with their factions (even in Israel) divided over patient tactics vs. more aggressive policies. In Jordan, they lead the political and popular choir of voices demanding the abrogation of the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. Yet they are not in a position to take power anywhere (beyond Gaza), and increasingly the “Game of Camps” has become, by 2024, a two-way race between the Iranians (who today are willing to work directly with MB elements such as Hamas, as the breach over Syria slowly heals) and the forces of stability. This could change, however, if Israel fails – due to external pressure or internal demoralization – to carry through the destruction of Hamas, making the latter into a successful symbol of religiously inspired “resistance”.
Iran’s camp also looms large, meanwhile, with Iran itself increasingly emboldened – as was made evident on 14 April – and now closer than ever to a military nuclear breakout. Tehran has made skillful use of the War in Ukraine to deploy (and promote) new indigenous technologies such as its Shahed drones and solidify a partnership with Russian president Vladimi Putin. And yet its points of weakness were also exposed, as the assault on Israel failed, Israel sent a sharp but limited riposte, and there were once again stirrings of dissent within Iranian society as the fear of war grew.
Foremost among Iran’s camp of proxies – self defined as the Axis of Resistance, muqawamah – is Hizbullah in Lebanon, effectively controlling the nodes of power there without taking over formally. Since October 8, when the group joined the war with a low-intensity campaign in the north, it has been leading Lebanon to the brink of an all-out war without ever asking for authorization from the nominal government in Lebanon. With regular ground forces, elite special forces, and a massive array of rockets and missiles, it is in many ways Israel’s most formidable enemy.
It faces problems of its own, however, and Hizbullah’s decision to avoid an all-out attack on Israel (despite the gradual escalation) reflects an awareness of its constraints. The years in which Hizbullah acted as an ally of President Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria left a stain on its legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of Sunnis across the region. The Beirut Port disaster in 2020 was seen as the result of Hizbullah control there. For many Lebanese, Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is primarily the agent of a foreign power. As parliamentary elections revealed, not even all Shi’a are loyal to him. None of this would prevent Hizbullah from launching massive firepower against Israel in the context of an all-out Iranian war against Israel. But it does make it more vulnerable if (or when) the IDF would turn such a war into an opportunity to maneuver against Hizbullah on Lebanese soil.
Another key Iranian proxy, the Houthi rebels holding much of Yemen, have shown an ability to conduct harmful asymmetrical warfare disrupting trade in the Red Sea (and effectively, for the first time in decades, blocking off the port of Eilat). Even before the international coalition played a role in defeating Iran’s direct attack on Israel, however, US and allied actions did reduce some capabilities of the regime in Sanaa, which cannot effectively defend itself against air attacks, and such counter-actions can yet escalate into counter-value as well as counter-force actions, if political condition in the US and Europe allow, and if Egyptian (and Israeli) pressures to ensure safe passage increase. The Houthis’ main challenge, after all, is not Israel but the Yemeni forces who oppose them, some backed by the Saudis and some (more effective) – by the UAE.
In Syria and in Iraq, local militias are loyal to Iran and have taken a limited part in attacks on Israel as well as on US assets: but an American warning to Iran did restrain them. Given the weakness of governments in both countries, these forces are there to stay for the foreseeable future. Syria is effectively a Russian-Iranian condominium, with the regime’s forces worn down in the murderous civil war: Hizbullah and others rode in to help Asad survive and partly stabilize. In Iraq, it was the Hashd al-Sha’abi – Popular Mobilization Forces – which helped defeat ISIS and is still a large and active force. But neither in Syria (where the presence of the US backed “Syrian Democratic Forces”, i.e the Kurds of Rojava, acts as a check in the strategically important northeast) nor in Iraq (where the government tries to walk a fine line between the regional camps) are they fully in control of power as Iran’s proxies are in Lebanon and Yemen.
Iran’s tentacles go elsewhere as well, from Sudan to the Sahel and Moroccan Sahara, and require careful monitoring. Tehran is working to patch up strained relations with Pakistan (mainly over the Baluchi question) and the Taliban in Afghanistan (who hate Shi’a and nurture territorial grudges) and is increasingly assertive in regional affairs. Yet ultimately, the fate of Tehran’s bid for hegemony hinges upon the ability to bring its military nuclear project to fruition.
Finally (and today, less significant), the Islamic State: One of the most significant changes in the map of camps has been the disappearance of the Islamic State territorial base of governance – which in 2014 seemed to create a new and powerful entity, deliberately ignoring the international borders delineated in the age of colonial rule. The “caliphate” fantasy of “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” (Ibrahim Samara’i by his real name) required what the Islamic State called tamkin, territorialization, namely the establishment of “provinces” governed by affiliates of the organization. These were quite extensive for a while but have been systematically reduced and eliminated since then.
Raqqa fell to the anti-IS coalition in 2017. The IS “province” in Libya was destroyed as well, and the Egyptian military has largely reduced if not eliminated altogether the IS “Sinai Province”. Still, as the massive terror attack in Moscow (March 22, 2024) reminded the world, all this did not completely remove the threat that IS – K (K for Khorasan, a term the group employs to cover Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent) and similar groups still pose, as they use the web for propaganda and recruitment. While Islamic State is thus no longer an equal contender in a four-way race for regional hegemony, it is still a threat to life and limb, globally, and to regional stability.
The camp of stability (for lack of a better name) is a collective name for those in the region who face the challenge of the Islamist revolutionaries and revisionists. Recent events have shown that despite considerable tensions within it, there are moments in which it can act – if brought together under American leadership, which has often been lacking.
Its mainstays, strategically, are Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. It includes, in effect, all the Gulf monarchies but one (Qatar, a Muslim Brotherhood ally), although Oman has a history of keeping channels open to Tehran, and Kuwait has a history of active hostility towards Israel (despite commonalities back in 1991). Jordan is a vital but vulnerable part – and played a useful role during the Iranian attack of April 14, 2024. In some respects, even the Palestinian Authority (or at least its security forces) can be counted as having a common interest with the camp – against ISIS, Hamas, and Iran’s PIJ proxy, even as it continues to nurture the culture of hate towards Israel.
Further afield, well before the Abraham Accords, Morocco had been and remains a pillar of the forces of stability in the Maghreb; and while hostile to Israel, the authoritarian leader of Tunisia today has taken a sharp anti-Islamist stand. Algeria, on the other hand, has emerged from a long war against Islamism, but now seems to court both Iranian friendship and Russian help – and may be utilized by Iran to endanger shipping lanes in the Mediterranean. Libya is still a battlefield, albeit less intensely than it was from 2014 to 2021, between Muslim Brotherhood elements backed by Turkey, and their enemy, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, backed by Egypt.
Where do we go from here?
The ability of the “Camp of Stability” to act together was enhanced when Israel, long assigned by the US military to its European Command (EUCOM), was re-assigned in 2021 to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AoR). Under the aegis of CENTCOM, which no longer feels obliged to keep a distance from Israel, effective means of military cooperation have been built between the nations associated with the camp, and the outline of a new regional balance could emerge if the patterns of military cooperation would be pursued.
On the other hand, however, US diplomatic and political actions – aimed at restraining Israel in its campaign to destroy Hamas, as well as the central role assigned in these efforts to Qatar, a highly problematic player – have been counterproductive, and send a disheartening signal to all of America’s traditional allies in the Camp of Stability.
In any case, with IS greatly reduced, and with the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood proposition now
dependent to some extent on Hamas’ survival in Gaza, what looms over the intermediate horizon is a direct confrontation between Iran’s camp and the forces of stability. The willingness and ability of the US and the West to confront Tehran – and avoid the temptation to postpone the inevitable by trying to appease it – could be a crucial factor: but Israel must also bear in mind that the reason for the regional change in its standing, in recent years, has been the expectation that it can also act decisively on its own, if need be, against the Iranian threat.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
