Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman

Some Israelis fear US plans to build an off-shore pier to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza could interfere with Israel’s war objectives. However, given the agreed interest in the success of the humanitarian effort, and the track record in recent years of close Israeli coordination with the US Central Command (CENTCOM), this could be a building block towards a coherent "day after" strategy, if political imperatives on both sides do not get in the way.

Beyond the intelligence value obtained and the possible leverage for the release of Israeli hostages, the symbolic signal sent by images of Hamas terrorists giving themselves up is strategically significant. Debunking the myth that Islamist "heroes" are willing to fight to the death, unlike their secular nationalist predecessors in past wars against Israel, should be among the long-term goals of the present conflict.

The hostage situation is of utmost importance and must be handled with sensitivity. Creativity, daring and flexibility are required to gain their release. The Government of Israel, however, must not be drawn into surrender to Hamas' demand to end the war. It should also resist the signs of demoralization and skepticism – in the media, and within the defense establishment – casting doubts on the prospects of bringing down Hamas' rule in Gaza, when progress on the ground points to the IDF's capabilities.

Without real action against Iran and its proxies, few if any in the region would feel safe signing on to the well-meant but ultimately delusional designs presented by Secretary of State Blinken in Munich.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi won a fully expected victory in the December 2023 elections for another term – with some 90% of the vote: This however does little to provide a solution for his country's acute problems.

Iran has significantly increased its stockpiles of uranium and according to estimates could produce enough Weapons Grade Uranium for a nuclear bomb within a week. There are indications Tehran is making progress toward tooling the parts of a bomb. Amid regional circumstances that are creating a window of opportunity, Israel must create legitimacy for action against Iran’s nuclear project.

Turkey, at least as long as the AKP is in power, cannot be considered a reliable partner for major national projects such as energy exports. Cyprus and to some extent Greece proved their value in an emergency as Israel's backup air and sea "rear areas." Sustaining an effective dialog with Cairo and avoiding acts and statements that would exacerbate tensions must remain a vital aspect of Israeli policy.

The US strategic commitment to deter external intervention provides Israel with the time and space to act decisively to destroy Hamas without being constrained by threats from Iran and its proxies. At the same time, Israel should forcefully put on the table the question of Doha’s hospitality to Hamas leadership.

Amid the ongoing complex negotiations of Saudi-Israeli normalization, keeping the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on board is essential. Despite grudges and occasional tensions, Jordan shares strategic interests with Saudi Arabia and stands to gain significant benefits once the proposed trade and transportation “corridor” from India to Europe passes through its territory. It is, therefore, advisable to leave the status quo in Jerusalem intact, and include Jordan in formulating any “package.”

Despite Republican efforts to ‘own’ Israel as a partisan cause, most Democrats remain supportive – a position vital to Israel’s military and diplomatic national security needs.

The first foreign minister to visit Greece after the swearing-in of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ new government was Israel’s Eli Cohen – a sign that both countries see the importance of their relationship and the new alignment of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. While new avenues of dialogue are opening between Jerusalem and Ankara – including a planned visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, officially confirmed by Erdogan – Israel’s priorities should remain firm. Pressure to agree to a gas pipeline to Turkey should be resisted. Regarding national security, the partnership with Greece and Cyprus is a game changer, giving Israel vital strategic depth during a conflict. Hence the importance of cooperation with both and support for Cyprus’s freedom to make its own foreign policy decisions.

Under the impact of terrorist attacks on Israelis and lawless vigilante raids on Arab villages, it is difficult to envision a return to conflict management of the Palestinian issue. Moreover, reactions in the West seem to feed Palestinian expectations of a backlash against Israel hence a reluctance to return to the Aqaba process. However, as the Palestinian security forces know all too well, there are no good alternatives to resuming dialogue within the regional framework. Israel is right to insist on a rapid return to the table with US, Jordanian and Egyptian involvement. The meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh should focus on common security challenges while setting aside the broader issues of the future. It can also allay growing concerns in Washington about Israel’s direction. At the right time, Israel can and should use the process to air lingering concerns about the virulent public domain in Jordan (and Egypt) and the need for the PA to act more resolutely against terrorist groups.

The time is ripe for Israel to take the initiative rather than wait for pre-arranged reciprocal terms and remove the critical remaining obstacle to full and formal diplomatic relations with the kingdom.

With Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza over, Israel must again focus on the challenge of Iran as a top priority. Given the urgency, now conveyed even by the US administration, the government must accelerate efforts to derail Tehran’s nuclear project. It is not the time to seek a defeat of Hamas or the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, but rather a continuation of conflict management. Israel should restore (albeit not fully trust) security cooperation with Ramallah, in the context of the process launched in Aqaba in late February; and in Gaza, to drive further the decoupling of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an Iranian proxy, from the Hamas de facto government.

The material and political support of the United States is an essential pillar in the national security of Israel. 

Egypt continues to play an active role in regional affairs, including the Aqaba emergency meeting on the Palestinian situation (February 26) and the ongoing effort to prevent escalation in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is in the middle of a significant financial crisis. The effects of the war in Ukraine – specifically, grain shortages – brought the Egyptian pound to more than 30 to the dollar, up from 20 in November and 15 in early 2022, facilitated by deliberate government action in response to demands by the IMF. Inflation still soars, and so does youth unemployment. All this could destabilize a nation of 105 million on our border, with dire consequences.

Israel is facing a series of critical decisions in the national security arena, and the necessary condition for dealing with those challenges is maintaining maximum national cohesion. Therefore, lowering the flames in the current public debates and reaching a compromise is imperative.

The positive and businesslike approach that marked the meeting of the Negev Forum Steering Committee and Working Groups in Abu Dhabi (January 9-10, 2023) proves that the drive to entrench and deepen the Abraham Accords is still ongoing despite the change of government in Israel. Hopes for a breakthrough in Saudi-Israeli relations are also still being nurtured, reflected in practical steps already taken. Moreover, the issue was raised with Jake Sullivan during his visit to Israel. Still, as the Arab saying goes, al-’ajalah min al-shaytan – haste is from the devil – and premature pronouncements have done more harm than good. The change will not come overnight: the Palestinian issue is still a stumbling block, and political dynamics in the Kingdom are complex, at least as long as King Salman still reins in some of his son’s ambitions.

The delineation of the Libyan and Turkish Exclusive Economic Zones was and remains essential not only for Israel and Egypt but also for others in the region who seek to curtail Erdogan’s ambitions and shore up Egypt’s economic and political stability.

The visit to Israel of the Moroccan Armed Forces commanding officer, Lieutenant General Belkhir El-Farouk, in mid-September was the latest sign of a flourishing relationship - despite the recall by Israel of its Ambassador in Rabat. As military and security cooperation with Morocco grows tighter – and in parallel, Israel draws closer to Egypt in several strategic aspects – the complex political situation in North Africa (specifically, the orientation of Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) requires closer Israeli attention.

The stability and orientation of the region's most populous country, Egypt, remain crucial components of the newly emerging regional security architecture and its new strategic alignments.

Israel offers the US military and, even more so, the intelligence community critical support. For example, the US Army has gained through the acquisition of the Iron Dome missile defense system, tank technology such as reactive armor, solutions to the challenge of terrorist improvised explosive devices, mine-clearing devices, and much more. In turn, the US defense establishment –specifically CENTCOM, now that Israel is in its area of responsibility – increasingly reflects Israeli perspectives in Washington policy debates. This has recently been the case on Iran.

The recurrent pattern of asking for more and more - reminiscent of the folk tale about the fisherman's greedy wife - has made a mockery of the ongoing attempt to diplomatically resolve the Israeli-Lebanese EEZ dispute. The negotiations have continued for years, and some in Lebanon understand the need for a negotiated outcome: but Hezbollah might yet again scuttle the deal.

The latest diplomatic moves demonstrate that despite recent events in Jerusalem, Israel has thwarted the Palestinian plan to force it into diplomatic isolation.

It is time to revive the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s famous dictum from the days of WWII regarding the stance toward the British: “We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there were no war.” This makes sense concerning Israel’s dilemma towards the US in the context of the renewal of the JCPOA.

Re-designating the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization after the drone attack on the UAE is imperative. This, along with overt support for the UAE, would deliver a sharp message and likely have a beneficial effect on Iranian conduct in Vienna.

It is not in America’s interest for Israel to be perceived as an obedient lap dog. On the contrary, keeping Israel’s options open, or even enhancing them, will ultimately prove to be of value to the US.

The Blue Flag 2021 air force exercise was the largest and most significant since the exercise series began in 2013.

The way Tehran uses military intimidation, as well as terror by proxy and other means of threatening regional players, must become a factor in the formulation of Western policy towards Iran in this decisive period.

With the help of American Jewry, a sturdy foundation of support for Israel-US ties needs to be rebuilt based upon traditional bipartisan commitment. This will enable Israel to engage effectively with the Biden Administration and Congress on the Iranian challenge.

The region, and Israel, need the ASEAN model of cooperation.

It should be made clear to Israel's partners in the eastern Mediterranean that any (unlikely) improvement in Israel’s relations with Turkey will not come at their expense. Despite some recent positive signals, Erdogan's basic orientation as an Islamist is bound to remain hostile.

Only time will tell whether Israel has been successful in buying for itself some time before it needs to “mow the grass” in Gaza again. In the meantime, Israel must learn from what transpired in “Operation Guardian of the Walls.”

If three core principles are maintained.

If the International Criminal Court of Justice conducted a fair investigation into the ongoing conflict, it would see that Hamas terrorists are committing double war crimes daily.

IDF strikes on Gaza's terrorists should be intense and aimed at causing severe damage to the intermediate level of command, infrastructure and weapons.

Amidst global turmoil, with Ankara seeking to lure away key regional players, the Greece-Israel partnership is a pillar of effective regional strategy.

By ignoring Israel’s views on an issue critical to its security, Washington will cast a dark shadow over Israel’s status as a key American ally in the Middle East.

The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran's breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a "longer, stronger" agreement.

Washington will bury any chance for peace if it reverts to the “Everybody Knows Paradigm” which demands Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines

Many have raised understandable moral qualms (and practical questions) about conduct of war in Yemen. Indeed, the coalition fighting the Houthi uprising should be more attentive to the loss of innocent lives. But allowing Iran’s proxies to win the war in Yemen would have dangerous political and far-reaching strategic consequences for Israel, the region, and US interests.

Establishing coherent US policy regarding brewing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean should be a Biden administration priority. By restraining Erdogan's ambitions, the US can add to stability and rebuild bridges with key European players and traditional US allies. The governments of Israel and Greece, in consultation with Egypt, should work together to advance this perspective in Washington.

It is possible to restore American bipartisan backing for Israel. Therefore, it is important to avoid being too identified with President Trump, despite Israeli gratitude due to him for many of his policies. Bonds between Israel and American Jewry should be bolstered; bridges should be built to both sides of the aisle in Congress; and US defense establishment support should be solicited. All this, in view of Israel's need to influence decisions in Washington on matters vital to its future.

Morocco has maintained open channels with Israel for many years, and it values the unique Jewish contribution to its heritage. A new pattern of normalization with Israel now extends from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Morocco’s coordination with the US also is a vital part of the emerging alignment of forces of stability in the region. Israel now should give this breakthrough a firm grounding in policies beneficial to both peoples.

The Palestinian quest for an internationally imposed “solution,” which would not require them to negotiate a compromise deal with Israel, has failed. Palestinian leaders may attempt this again after Joe Biden becomes US president, but this will fail yet again, since the collapse of their past strategy is due to much more than the policies of the Trump Administration. Indeed, evolving regional and global realities allow for a new Israeli peace initiative, which can preserve the underlying principles of the Trump outline for peace.

The taking out of the senior Iranian nuclear scientist is a blow to the Iranian leadership as much as the killing of Qassem Suleimani was. But it is also a signal to the next administration in Washington. The president-elect will not be able to deal with the Iranian nuclear project like just another diplomatic issue.

Israel should seek to persuade the Biden transition team not to offer Iran any premature concessions; it should outline what would constitute an acceptable, "stronger and longer" deal; find other international actors to support the policy suggested by Israel (possibly France and even Russia); and prepare a viable military option, both to strengthen America’s negotiating hand and as an option in the case of failure to reverse Iran's present course.

To acquire greater freedom of action in dealing with Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, Israel needs to minimize tensions with the US on the Palestinian front.

Egypt's public welcome of the normalization between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan is one of the payoffs emerging from the important Egypt-Israel partnership in the eastern Mediterranean.

The current political situation in Lebanon is very problematic. Hizbullah enjoys full freedom of action in a country which long ago became dysfunctional. Hence the importance of lending support to the French effort to bring about systemic change in the Lebanese confessional order. Further descent into chaos and/or growing intervention by Turkey would be even more dangerous for Israel.

The peace deals between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain mark the completion of an existing process by which the region's stabilizing forces are banding together against the Iranian threat.

Israel is a key player in the crisis currently unfolding in the eastern Mediterranean basin, on the same side as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Greece.

Israel should act to ensure that the Greek-Egyptian EEZ delimitation map is globally endorsed, as opposed to the Turkish-GNA alternative, and work in the American arena to curb Erdogan’s ambitions.

Israel is unable to get directly involved in eastern Mediterranean hostilities, should they erupt. But it can and should cooperate closely with Greece in intelligence matters and arms acquisition and coordinate political action with Greece in Washington. The US stance largely will determine the practical scope of Erdogan’s ambitions.

Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran's presence in Syria.

The American peace plan provides a historic opportunity to break the futile paradigm based on the 1967 lines and ensure Israeli national security for the long term. In terms of security – protecting Israel, stabilizing Jordan, and preventing a terrorist takeover of a future Palestinian entity – and given the supreme importance of national cohesion, it is imperative to focus on the Jordan Valley and the Jerusalem envelope.

The Trump Plan is the most realistic route for progress towards the goal of “two states for two peoples.” Therefore, the Israeli national unity government should embrace the Trump plan in its entirety, including negotiations towards establishment of a Palestinian state, and at the same time act (in the first stage) to apply Israeli law to the Jordan Valley and strategically significant areas in the Jerusalem envelope, such as Maaleh Adumim and Gush Etzion. An Israeli consensus exists regarding these areas.

Dramatic gains on the battlefield by the forces loyal to the Turkish-backed "Government of National Accord" in western Libya have given Erdogan a victory, which may endanger the future of the eastern Mediterranean. Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel must coordinate their policies in response. A tripartite Greek-Cypriot-Israeli summit should be held urgently to annul the GNA-Libyan EEZ agreement, to present an alternative map of the Mediterranean, and to encourage a robust reaction of the EU. The US must be persuaded to pressure Turkey revoke the EEZ MoU (while still letting Erdogan take pride in saving the GNA from ruin).

Rejection of the Trump plan outright, denunciation of any steps towards its implementation, and adherence to the failed Oslo-era paradigm for peace – is certain to condemn all sides to continued conflict.

Overall, Israeli society has remained resilient in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there are reasons to rate highly key aspects of the government’s response.

The resilence of Israeli society at a time of national emergency (the corona pandemic) has direct strategic and security implications. Despite the huge budgetary challenge, it is vital to maintain investment in advanced IDF military capabilities, because a nuclear confrontation with Iran is still possible.

Even if the Palestinians reject Trump's peace plan, it still serves their long-term interests. False, undeliverable expectations – based on the assumption that "everybody knows" what Israel will be forced to concede – eventually need to give way to a more realistic paradigm, which in turn may lead to a better life for both sides.

Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.

A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump's regional allies, including Israel.

It would undoubtedly serve Israel's interest for Russia to draw closer to the US on a wide range of issues, and above all, on Iran.

The Jewish state’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger for resting on an informal basis; replacing it with a formal alliance would do no good and only anger the world’s other major power.

Israel needs enhanced naval capability for the protection of its own EEZ and for the creation of a proper balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

If it weren't for the Iranian regime's distress, it might decide to tread water until US President Trump was out of office. But its resources are limited, and the possibility that the ayatollahs might attack Israel out of desperation is very real.

What Can and Should Be Done to Limit the Scope of the Turkish Assault on Rojava?

Chinese investment in Iran would help Tehran withstand US economic pressures, and exacerbate the Western crisis with Iran

Overlooked in the controversy regarding Trump, Omar and Tlaib, and Israel: The imperative of maintaining Israel’s sovereign decision-making.

Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus must encourage the US to assert a higher military and diplomatic profile as a counterweight to Turkish pressures, Russian and Iranian ambitions, and Chinese inroads.

The US, Europe and Israel can force a modification in Erdoğan's conduct on a wide range of issues, including his duplicity on Iran, support for Hamas in Gaza, subversion in Jerusalem, intervention in Libya, aggression towards Cypriot gas explorations, threats to Kurds of Rojava, and repression at home.

The need to assign American soldiers to fight with Israel might undermine Israel's popularity in the US and constrain its freedom of action.

Beyond Elounda, Beersheba, Cairo and Jerusalem.
The emerging informal alliance in the eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly significant. Egypt’s role, Erdogan's ambitions, energy resources, joint military exercises and coordinated emergency responses contribute to the alliance.

Israel needs to be prepared for potentially dramatic consequences, including rapid deterioration towards confrontation on all Israel’s borders. Resilience and readiness to act can serve to deter provocations by Iran’s proxies. Ultimately, only a credible military threat from Israel will indicate to friend and foe alike that in a showdown, Iran will be forced to back down.

It is in Israel's interest to solidify the Egyptian role in Gaza, in the context of "conflict management" as a governing policy concept. Egyptian participation in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza serves as an important component in the vital Egypt-Israel relationship. It also helps erode Hamas' pretensions of Jihad.

The IDF's response will be harsher than usual, not because Israelis in the center are more valued than those in the periphery but because of the emerging need to show Hamas that it has grossly misjudged.

Minister Yisrael Katz should restore and reinvigorate the Israeli foreign service. Israel’s many recent diplomatic breakthroughs require systemic and sustained follow-up by a strong and committed cadre of professionals.

Military, diplomatic and economic pressures can be brought to bear to preserve SDF and Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, and to deter Turkey and Iran from conquering these areas.

For analytical as well as practical and even political reasons, the time has come to re-define Israel’s place in the world in terms of belonging to the “eastern Mediterranean” region, not the “Middle East.”

It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.

Israel's strategy toward China doesn't conflict with American interests; rather, it serves and reinforces them. Partnering with Beijing can help stabilize the Middle East. Partnering with Asian nations threatened by Beijing can help build a counterbalance to Chinese power.

The challenge now is how to make it clear to the Hamas leadership that it should not believe is own supercilious words.

The Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian summit held last month in Crete focused on energy connectivity and Turkish threats, but it also paid lip service to Egyptian pro-Palestinian messages, which is problematic.

Amidst violent events, it is easy to be tempted to seek decisive "solutions" to the Palestinian problem(s) – in both the PA areas and in Gaza – through drastic military action, or through equally dramatic concessions. But given the lessons of recent history, as well as the unpredictable nature of regional events, it makes sense to adhere to "conflict management" and piecemeal arrangements. This is not as a cowardly choice by hapless political and military leaders, but as a rational choice in irrational circumstances; even more so when the Iranian challenge looms larger than ever on Israel's immediate horizons. Patience has its own merits.

Israel's actions (or at times, inaction) concerning the future of the Gaza Strip cannot be isolated from the broader context of the struggle over the entire region's balance of power. Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, and perhaps Cyprus, constitutes a common interest of the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, to curb the influence of both Turkey and Iran, and to deny Abu Mazen the baneful position of a spoiler.

Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.

While Israel should steer away from overt identification with internal challengers in Iran, this is the time to urge the US. and other like-inded nations to ratchet up the pressure on the regime, explaining to the Iranian people the growing cost of their leaders' ambitions.

Despite many Israelis’ growing frustration, there are good reasons why the IDF has yet to use all of its force to combat the growing terrorism from the Gaza Strip, including the fact the IDF is focused on the northern front where Israel faces its main enemy: Iran.

How the wise use of force facilitates diplomatic processes in the Israel-Egypt-Hamas and Israel-Russia-Syria triangles

What is needed is a conscious effort to change Israel’s one-party partisan image by engaging with the Democrats and the social groups that support them.

If recruiting a disgraced former official with no access to updated information is the best Iran's spymasters could do, Israel's intelligence superiority is in no danger.

Israel's national interest, and the broader patterns of cooperation among key regional partners in the "camp of stability," require close attention to the needs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. For decades, it has been, and remains, part of Israel's strategic depth.

The UNHRC was hopelessly biased, obsessed with Israel, and highly tolerant towards a full range of human rights abusers.

Israel may soon face a dilemma. The "arrangement" with Russia as to the future of Syria may stave-off an Iranian presence but will pose an existential danger to the groups of rebels near the border – groups which have worked closely with the IDF to prevent direct friction with hostile elements on the line of contact. It is vital that the solutions to this challenge demonstrate to future partners that Israel does not turn its back on those who have assisted it facing a common threat.

Israel must make it clear to Hamas that letting Islamic Jihad trigger another widespread escalation does not serve its interests or its continued existence.

Greece, Cyprus and Israel Consolidate their Cooperation.

The Iranian provocation on the Golan Heights failed, and the Iranians would do well to cut their losses now and end their confrontation with Israel.

Israel's revelation of Iran's nuclear deception aims to show the world that the 2015 deal with Iran must indeed be renegotiated in the interests of global peace.

The French president's visit to served to demonstrate Macron's importance as a dynamic and proactive European player, and as a partner in the effort to curb Iran's strategic ambitions.

The American-British-French strike in Syria should be seen as an exercise in building Western deterrence and creditability in advance of the decision expected next month regarding the nuclear deal with Iran.

Hopes and fears abound as President Sisi begins his second term. The winter of 2011 seemed to usher in a democratic spring. But the spring of 2018 seems to be authoritarian autumn.

Israel and America must avoid one-fit-all options regarding the military challenges in different parts of disintegrating Syria.

President Erdogan is taking Turkey in dangerous directions. The conquest of the Kurdish 'Afrin enclave lends momentum to his ambitions. Erdogan must pay a manifest price for leading Turkey towards dictatorship and Islamism.

By leveraging its remarkable achievements in the fields most relevant to future conflicts, Israel can transition from dependence on the U.S. to partnership.

The Iranian situation is both more urgent and more malleable than the almost hopeless situation with North Korea.