Turkey

It should be made clear to Israel's partners in the eastern Mediterranean that any (unlikely) improvement in Israel’s relations with Turkey will not come at their expense. Despite some recent positive signals, Erdogan's basic orientation as an Islamist is bound to remain hostile.

Neither Ankara nor Tehran want a strong Iraq, or a strong Syria. On the contrary, the fragmentation of these countries suits both.

A storm over a petition by retired naval officers once again has revealed longstanding tensions between the civilian Turkish government and the Turkish military, and Erdogan’s plans for advancing pro-regime Islamists in the military.

Israel should exploit the expanding rift between Ankara and Tehran to normalize its relations with Turkey. This also could bring Turkey into the circle of countries supporting the Abraham Accords.

Turkey and Pakistan’s growing closeness has deep foundations. These are two countries following a similar trajectory.

Erdoğan has created a private military and paramilitary system. He deploys this apparatus for domestic and foreign operations without official oversight.

Only the very optimistic could believe in real strategic cooperation between Erdogan’s regime and Jerusalem.

Turkey wants to have it both ways: To act against the Salafists, while using them as dispensable mercenaries against the Kurds.

Turkey’s ambitious and expansionist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has capitalized on the end of the Cold War and on US isolationist tendencies in enhancing Turkey’s international standing.

Israel is unable to get directly involved in eastern Mediterranean hostilities, should they erupt. But it can and should cooperate closely with Greece in intelligence matters and arms acquisition and coordinate political action with Greece in Washington. The US stance largely will determine the practical scope of Erdogan’s ambitions.

Ankara's military interventions in Iraq, Syria and Libya as well as its growing presence in the eastern Mediterranean constitutes a radical change in Turkish foreign policy. Its recent success in Libya demonstrates Ankara’s regional heft. Turkey’s next intervention is probably in Yemen.

From northwest Iraq to Tripoli on Libya’s African coast, Turkey is flexing its muscles – without the slightest nod to the supposedly ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-NATO’ orientation that Turkey’s Western apologists like to recall.

A strong Turkish foothold in Libya threatens the free flow of energy resources from the Eastern Mediterranean basin to Europe as planned by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Italy and Israel.

Russia’s desire to woo Turkey from the West likely to prevent all-out war.

Israel needs enhanced naval capability for the protection of its own EEZ and for the creation of a proper balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

On "Kurdophobia," Refugees and Reviving the National Pact Borders.

What Can and Should Be Done to Limit the Scope of the Turkish Assault on Rojava?

While a determined Western-led effort to halt the Turkish invasion could still prevent Russian, Iranian and IS gains, time is growing short.

The Turkey-Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood alliance first came to prominence in the early, optimistic months of the “Arab Spring.”

Turkish forces are also present in northern Iraq, where they are engaged in action against the PKK presence in the Kurdish-controlled north.

The US, Europe and Israel can force a modification in Erdoğan's conduct on a wide range of issues, including his duplicity on Iran, support for Hamas in Gaza, subversion in Jerusalem, intervention in Libya, aggression towards Cypriot gas explorations, threats to Kurds of Rojava, and repression at home.

Military, diplomatic and economic pressures can be brought to bear to preserve SDF and Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, and to deter Turkey and Iran from conquering these areas.

Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.

Turkey is turning northern Syria – Jarabulus and Afrin – into the “Turkish Republic of Northern Syria,” just as it has turned northern Cyprus into a Turkish protectorate through military and economic domination.

Ankara is allowing Hamas to continue operating from Turkish territory against Israel. Israel can and should thwart such Turkish violations of the reconciliation agreement between the two countries.

Israel should be defending itself against Erdogan by blocking his Jerusalem incursion, and taking the offensive against Erdogan by impeding his military build-up.

Turkey is no longer a reliable Western ally. Provision of the F-35 jet would strengthen Erdogan's authoritarian Islamist regime and boost its capabilities for regional mischief.

Israel should ring the alarm bells about Turkish adventurism. Under Erdogan, Turkey has become a dangerous country on the road to authoritarianism.

“Sadat” is heavily involved in Ankara’s training of Syrian Sunni rebels for the fight against Assad.

All indications suggest that for Turkey, the recent battles were only a phase in a larger process. So where might Turkey turn next? And what is the goal of the Turkish campaign?

President Erdogan is taking Turkey in dangerous directions. The conquest of the Kurdish 'Afrin enclave lends momentum to his ambitions. Erdogan must pay a manifest price for leading Turkey towards dictatorship and Islamism.

How the arrest of this Kurdish leader is handled will indicate the extent to which the Syrian Kurds’ central role in the fight against the Islamic State has accrued some broader political legitimacy for their leadership. This, in turn, has implications for the troubled relationship between the West and Turkey.

While Israel cannot let Turkish President Erdogan's attacks slide, its response must differentiate between Turkish society and its popular but problematic leader.