Syria

Israel should reject any overtures from the Assad government, and help keep “maximum pressure” on the regime.

Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran's presence in Syria.

A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.

Bashar Assad is not about to fall, But economic deterioration, regime infighting, sanctions and unrest are combining to place his regime under renewed, severe pressure.

There is a discrepancy between the stated goal – the expulsion of Iran from Syria – and the means being employed by Israel to achieve it.

Russia’s desire to woo Turkey from the West likely to prevent all-out war.

Behind Enemy Lines: Iran, Hezbollah and ongoing, armed resistance to Syria’s regime merge to create constant chaos.

Despite Syrian-Turkish clashes this week, Moscow is set to remain the key arbiter in Syria.

Meeting with Assad sent clear messages to the countries of the region.

The congressional bill will exacerbate the economic situation in Syria and ultimately increase Syria’s dependency on Iran.

New Year, Same Chaos in Syria.

It is in Israel’s interest that Assad regain control of northwestern Syria. Aside from improving the economic situation in Syria, this may increase Israeli leverage in the campaign against Iran's military entrenchment.

The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.

Given Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel must employ focused, operative rhetoric and policy versus the strategic threats it faces.

Israel must adapt as quickly as possible to the evolving situation in northern Syria, while continuing to adhere to self-reliance and invest in its military.

Islamic State, that most malignant expression of the Sunni Islamist trend, was the natural enemy of this emergent Kurdish autonomy.

Once again, Kurds are complaining of “betrayal.”

Trump’s Syria decision accords with previous presidential decisions and is not necessarily a disaster for Israel.

The U.S. withdrawal makes Russia the new arbiter of everyone’s interests, including Israel’s.

On "Kurdophobia," Refugees and Reviving the National Pact Borders.

What Can and Should Be Done to Limit the Scope of the Turkish Assault on Rojava?

While a determined Western-led effort to halt the Turkish invasion could still prevent Russian, Iranian and IS gains, time is growing short.

The move confirms that the current US administration is not interested in heading an alliance of regional forces against Iranian expansionism or Sunni political Islam, but is, like its predecessor, managing imperial decline.

With the regional focus elsewhere, violence in Syria grinds on. International backers of the various enclaves have a greater say in the direction of events than do their Syrian clients.

Iran is continually expanding its military, economic and political presence in Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s February 25 visit to Iran was an important marker in these efforts. Assad met with Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, who labeled him the “hero of the Arab world.” The presence of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and

The fight to depose Assad is over. The battle over his regime’s boundaries has no end in sight.

No new beginnings in sight for ravaged Syria.

Arab countries are re-normalizing their relations with the Assad regime, seeking to balance the strong Iranian and Turkish influences in Syria and to achieve some degree of influence in a new Syrian political-strategic structure. This further cements a Russian-oriented strategic architecture in the region. In the long term, this could lead to tensions between conservative Arab states and Israel, if Israel targets the Syrian military and government in the campaign against Iran, or if Israel continues to promote diplomatic recognition of its Golan annexation.

One way Iran’s efforts are taking place are below the official Syrian state structures – in the arming and sponsoring of Iran-controlled paramilitary formations on Syria soil.

Israel will need to increase the intensity of its operations against the Iranians. US withdrawal from the arena is a good opportunity for Israel to update its strategy in Syria.

The possibility that Iran and Turkey will be emboldened by the American decision, is worrisome. The main counter to that will be robust deterrence from Israel, whose maintenance may increase the likeliness of escalation in Syria and Lebanon, and even more resort to the restraining hand of Russia.

Military, diplomatic and economic pressures can be brought to bear to preserve SDF and Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, and to deter Turkey and Iran from conquering these areas.

Syrian regime closes accounts with West and Israel-linked rebels, as Iran builds and expands its presence in the area.

The killing of prominent Arab tribal leader Sheikh Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi has serious implications for the US and Kurdish administered part of Syria, in which Raqqa is located. That administration of Syria has many enemies and remains fragile.

Iran is hiding its efforts to establish a presence in Syria, for both internal and external reasons. This policy involves numerous internal contradictions and to avoid admitting to them, the IRGC and Hezbollah are conducting a propaganda campaign.

Israel has fully joined the battle in Syria—but it's not clear it can achieve any of its goals there.

Russia is actively promoting international involvement in the reconstruction of Syria as a humanitarian effort aimed at creating the conditions for refugees to return, but in practice this will reinforce the foundations of Assad’s rule and territorial control. The US is in no hurry to respond, but the Russian initiative will not remain unanswered.

Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.

JISS fellow Dr. Jonathan Spyer travelled in late July to the SDF enclave in eastern Syria. He reports that maintenance of this enclave is critical to keeping a substantial physical obstacle to the Iranian goal of a contiguous corridor from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

The likely emergent picture in Syria, as in Lebanon, is the ongoing consolidation of another IRGC project, in the framework of a weakened and truncated Arab state, along with an ongoing Israeli effort to deter the masters of this project from acts of aggression.

It remains deeply open to question as to whether Putin has either the will or the capability to prevent Iranian deployment in the border area.

Israel may soon face a dilemma. The "arrangement" with Russia as to the future of Syria may stave-off an Iranian presence but will pose an existential danger to the groups of rebels near the border – groups which have worked closely with the IDF to prevent direct friction with hostile elements on the line of contact. It is vital that the solutions to this challenge demonstrate to future partners that Israel does not turn its back on those who have assisted it facing a common threat.

It's not an Assad victory — it's a frozen conflict.

Don't congratulate the administration on avoiding Russian retaliation. The humanitarian crisis in Syria remains, and the real collision course here is between Israel and Iran.

The American-British-French strike in Syria should be seen as an exercise in building Western deterrence and creditability in advance of the decision expected next month regarding the nuclear deal with Iran.

With global tensions on the rise, Israel could find itself alone, both in the struggle to prevent a nuclear Iran and in trying to contain Iran's actions in Syria.

Russia may demand due consideration, but Israel has proved time and again that it will not allow Iran to tighten its grip on Syria, even if doing so stokes regional tensions.

Israel and America must avoid one-fit-all options regarding the military challenges in different parts of disintegrating Syria.

How the arrest of this Kurdish leader is handled will indicate the extent to which the Syrian Kurds’ central role in the fight against the Islamic State has accrued some broader political legitimacy for their leadership. This, in turn, has implications for the troubled relationship between the West and Turkey.

A controlled military disentanglement, while bound to afford Putin even greater popularity at home and perhaps rebuild his popular image abroad, by no means implies that he is about to relinquish his growing influence in the Middle East.