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דף הבית / Policy Papers / Syria
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad might have decided to cement his friendship with Tehran, fearing that Moscow’s capacity to invest in Syria’s reconstruction would be negatively affected. Assad may also try to play Iran against its Gulf rivals to draw resources from both.
In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Arab diplomatic efforts unlikely to shift Tehran’s extensive infrastructure.
US determination to draw down in the Middle East, which characterized the Obama, Trump and now Biden administrations, appears likely to prevent the development of any coherent strategy.
As Israel and Syria concluded a deal on the return of an Israeli woman from Syria, questions arise regarding the cost and what the future of such transactions with Russian mediation should be.
Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.
Israel should reject any overtures from the Assad government, and help keep “maximum pressure” on the regime.
Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran's presence in Syria.
A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.
Bashar Assad is not about to fall, But economic deterioration, regime infighting, sanctions and unrest are combining to place his regime under renewed, severe pressure.
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